Worse than Pirates or Prussian Chancellors: A State\u27s Authority to Opt-Out of the Quid Pro Quo by Duff, Michael C.
Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 2 Spring Article 2
2016
Worse than Pirates or Prussian Chancellors: A
State's Authority to Opt-Out of the Quid Pro Quo
Michael C. Duff
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/benefits
Part of the Social Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael C. Duff,Worse than Pirates or Prussian Chancellors: A State's Authority to Opt-Out of the Quid Pro Quo, 17 Mar. Ben. & Soc.
Welfare L. Rev. 2 (2016).
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
 
123 
WORSE THAN PIRATES OR PRUSSIAN 
CHANCELLORS: A STATE’S AUTHORITY TO 
OPT-OUT OF THE QUID PRO QUO 
Michael C. Duff* 
Privatization of public law dispute resolution in workplaces 
has been under intense scrutiny in the context of arbitration. 
Another kind of workplace dispute privatization is presently 
underway, or under serious consideration, in several states. In 
connection with state workers’ compensation statutes, one state 
has implemented, and others are considering, a dispute resolution 
model in which employers are explicitly authorized to “opt out” of 
coverage. “Alternative benefit plans,” created under such 
statutes, permit employers to, among other things, unilaterally 
and without limitation designate private fact-finders, whose 
conclusions are subject to highly deferential judicial review. This 
model is arbitration on steroids. While there may be doubts in 
some quarters about the neutrality of arbitrators, reasonable 
doubts about the loyalties of an employer-appointed fact-finder 
are inevitable. Such a design would mark a decisive break with 
the quid pro quo/Grand Bargain of the early twentieth century, 
and there is a risk of some states getting caught up in a “race to 
the bottom,” where states not recognizing a right to a remedy for 
physical injury become havens of low-cost labor, and thus exert 
pressure on states that safeguard traditional rights to follow suit. 
In response to this newest wave of innovation, the Supreme 
Court may be forced to intimate an opinion on the constitutional 
right to a remedy for personal, and especially physical, injury 
(whether within or outside of the workplace). The Court has not 
squarely addressed the issue since 1917, when it decided New 
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York Cent. R. Co. v. White, a case originally upholding the 
constitutionality of workers’ compensation systems. In White, the 
Court hinted, but did not clearly establish, that the right to a 
remedy for physical injury may not be abolished without 
substitution of a reasonable remedy. 
Workers’ compensation opt out is in reality part of a larger 
discussion about “tort reform.” This article discusses various 
theories of restraint of state legislatures implementing reforms in 
personal injury remedies. Ultimately the article concludes that 
the judiciary should apply heightened scrutiny when considering 
constitutional challenges to significant reforms of such remedies. 
No civilized society would subject significant legislative 
reductions to remedies for personal injury to merely cursory 
judicial review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Privatization1 of public law dispute resolution in workplaces 
has been under intense scrutiny in recent years, most frequently 
in the context of arbitration.2  Whether one agrees or disagrees 
with compulsory arbitration of workplace claims, its existence is 
no longer remarkable.3  Yet, it might be surprising to some that 
compulsory arbitration has expanded beyond workplace disputes 
to tort claims and personal injury actions.  A close reading of the 
Supreme Court’s startling4 2012 opinion in Marmet Health Care 
Center v. Brown,5 in which the Court announced, in a per curiam 
opinion, that personal injury and wrongful death suits are covered 
by the Federal Arbitration Act,6 suggests that the scope of 
arbitration will likely expand.7  As important as the policies and 
values inherent in employment law may be, the law of personal 
 
 1.  U.S. EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.002 (July 10, 1997), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html (“1. SUBJECT: Policy Statement on 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a 
Condition of Employment.”) (arguing that compulsory arbitration privatizes 
governmental anti-discrimination enforcement). 
 2.  See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-
of-the-justice-system.html?_r=1. 
 3.  See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN 
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 7-9 (2013). 
 4.  Readers, believing that people entering into arbitration agreements read or 
understand what they are entering into, may not have been startled by the opinion.  
Others might have sympathy with the West Virginia Supreme Court’s view that “as a 
matter of public policy under West Virginia Law, an arbitration clause in a nursing 
home admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results 
in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a 
dispute concerning the negligence.”  Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 
724 S.E.2d 250, 292 (W. Va. 2011), vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. 
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). 
 5.  132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
 6.  Id.  The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) federalizes agreements to arbitrate.  
If a court concludes that such an agreement exists, it will, as a matter of federal law, 
enforce it and dismiss, or hold in abeyance court suits filed on the merits of disputes 
even arguable within the agreement’s ambit.  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1991). 
 7.  Marmet Health, 132 S. Ct. at 1203 (“The statute’s text includes no exception 
for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims.  It ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain 
of the parties to arbitrate.’”) (internal citation omitted).  It is worth noting that the 
American Bar Association has taken a formal position against the type of pre-injury 
waivers of wrongful death claims that were at issue in Marmet.  See ABA Comm’n on 
Law and Aging, Rep. 111B (2009) (adopted by the House of Delegates Feb. 16, 2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2009_my_111b.authc
heckdam.pdf. 
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injury is older, even ancient.8  Tort values are difficult to square 
with notions of arbitration contracts or of the waiver of rights in 
employment or commercial contexts.9  A requirement that an 
employee—or anyone—must compromise the right to a personal 
injury lawsuit before understanding the nature or extent of a 
subsequently suffered injury is disquieting.  The American 
Arbitration Association has frequently declined to conduct 
arbitrations based on pre-injury agreements to arbitrate medical 
malpractice cases.10  Even during the peak of industrialism, not 
far removed in time from Lochner, some late nineteenth century 
courts refused to enforce pre-injury waivers of tort suits—the 
exclusive cause of action for workplace injury prior to the early 
twentieth century—by employees against their employers.11 
Another kind of workplace dispute privatization is presently 
underway in several states.12  In connection with century-old 
workers’ compensation laws—the successors to tort laws and 
especially to the law of negligence13—one state has 
implemented,14 and others are considering,15 a dispute resolution 
model in which employers are authorized to opt out of coverage by 
workers’ compensation statutes.  “Alternative benefit plans,” 
 
 8.  Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century 
Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 1127, 1128 (1990): 
Judges from the seventeenth century in England to the nineteenth 
century in the United States expressed in their tort decisions the 
same policies, the same values, and the same principles.  They used 
tort law to make people behave in morally appropriate ways by 
holding them to community standards of reasonable behavior in the 
circumstances in order to minimize injuries and losses, and to 
promote honesty and fairness in economic relationships.  In certain 
kinds of cases, these principles led judges to hold defendants strictly 
liable. 
Id. 
 9.  Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 253, 273 
(2004) (“At the extreme, unrestrained enforcement of arbitration clauses could make 
all tort policy considerations disappear altogether”). 
 10.  Crossman v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 738 S.E.2d 737, 739 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); 
Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, 759 S.E.2d 727, 730 (S.C. 2014).  
 11.  Johnson v. Philadelphia & R.R. Co., 29 A.854 (Pa. 1894). 
 12.  See infra Part III. 
 13.  See infra Part II. 
 14.  See infra Part III. B. 
 15.  Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to 
Ditch Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA, Oct. 14, 2015, 
https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-
comp [hereinafter Grabell & Berkes]. 
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created under opt-out statutes,16 permit employers to, among 
other things, designate private workers’ compensation fact 
finders,17 whose findings of fact are subjected to highly deferential 
judicial review.18  This model is arbitration on steroids.  While 
there may be doubts in some quarters about the neutrality of 
arbitrators,19 reasonable doubts about the loyalties of an 
employer-appointed fact-finder are inevitable.20 
Preliminarily, it might be argued that an employer’s opting 
out of coverage by a workers’ compensation statute is acceptable 
if employees have knowingly signed pre-injury waivers of 
workers’ compensation benefits.  Leaving to one side whether 
such a waiver would ever tend to be knowing, experience in Texas 
(the largest opt-out state)21 has shown that employers frequently 
make no attempt to have their employees sign waivers.22 
Workers’ compensation law generally limits employees to 
workers’ compensation benefits in lieu of tort damages for 
personal injuries suffered in the workplace, a principle known as 
“the exclusive remedy rule.”23  In states that retain the exclusive 
remedy rule and that allow employers to opt-out of the workers’ 
 
 16.  TEX. LAB. CODE. ANN. § 406.002 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A §§ 3, 
202 (West 2015). 
 17.  See Oklahoma Injury Benefit Act, which states: 
The claimant may appeal in writing an initial adverse benefit 
determination to an appeals committee within one hundred eighty 
(180) days following his or her receipt of the adverse benefit 
determination.  The appeal shall be heard by a committee consisting 
of at least three people that were not involved in the original 
adverse benefit determination.  The appeals committee shall not 
give any deference to the claimant’s initial adverse benefit 
determination in its review. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 211(B)(1) (West 2015).  Thus, the employer may appoint 
as fact finder any three individuals who “were not involved in the original adverse 
benefit determination.” 
 18.  See infra Part III. B. 
 19.  See generally Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (2011). 
 20.  “Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable, but ‘our 
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.’” 
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (internal citations omitted). 
 21.  See infra Part III. A. 
 22.  Although dated, figures from 2001 showed that only about seven percent of 
opt-out employers required their employees to sign waivers. Joseph Shields & John 
Schnautz, Litigation Trends and the Use of Liability Waivers by Nonsubscribing 
Employers, 6:4 TEXAS MONITOR (Winter 2001) (RESEARCH & OVERSIGHT COUNCIL ON 
WORKERS’ COMP., TEX. DEP’T INS.), available at 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/wcreg/mon6-4waiver.html. 
 23.  MICHAEL C. DUFF, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 326 (2013). 
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compensation system, employees of opt-out employers are left 
with no legal remedy for workplace injury.  Admittedly, employees 
acquiescing to mandatory arbitration of other employment claims 
are often in similar straits.24  However, workers’ compensation 
opt-out potentially leaves employees even more vulnerable,25 
because of the possible scope and magnitude of injury claims,26 
and because of employers’ legally-conferred discretion to choose 
dispute fact finders.27 
This Article discusses both opt-out and a type of incremental 
erosion of workers’ compensation benefits transpiring in some 
states.28  More broadly, this article concerns “tort reform.”  At 
times, this article discusses, interchangeably, state legislative 
remedial limitations of tort and workers’ compensation because 
the two bodies of law each concern state law remedies for 
personal, and especially physical, injury.29  Thus, while this 
article is about the somewhat novel workers’ compensation opt-
out phenomenon, it is more broadly about the authority of states 
to curtail the right to a remedy for personal injury.  The question 
has come up repeatedly in recent decades in contexts such as “tort 
reform,”30 “medical malpractice reform,”31 and the application of 
state statutes of repose to bar tort claims.32  In short, the question 
of the limits of state interference with tort remedies comes up 
whenever legislatures attempt to decrease plaintiff tort 
compensation.33  Virtually the same questions are implicated by 
 
 24.  As a practical matter, there is almost no substantive judicial review of an 
arbitration award.  9 U.S.C.S. §§ 9-11 (2008). 
 25.  For an excellent introduction to opt-out, see Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15. 
 26.  In 2014, private industry reported three million nonfatal workplace injuries 
and illnesses, a rate of roughly 3.2 cases per 100 full-time workers. BUREAU OF LAB. 
STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses—2014 
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/osh.pdf. 
 27.  See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.  In Texas and Oklahoma 
employers are able to combine opt-out with arbitration. See infra Parts III. A., III. B. 
 28.  See infra Part III. 
 29.  See, e.g., infra Part IV. A. 
 30.  Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789, 795 (Or. 1995) (upholding $500,000 statutory 
cap on awards of noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions on theory that 
plaintiff had received a substantial remedy). 
 31.  Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 829 (N.H. 1980) (striking several provisions 
modifying tort law as applied to medical malpractice); see infra Part IV. C. 
 32.  Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 319-20 (N.D. 1986). 
 33.  Typical legislative reforms have included measures capping damages and 
attorney fees, adopting shortened statutes of limitations or statutes of repose, 
increasing the difficulty of certifying class actions, mandating bifurcation or other 
means of restructuring trials, narrowing standards of liability, providing for close 
judicial review of jury findings, abolishing or limiting joint and several liability, and 
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workers’ compensation reform because workers’ compensation 
rights have been, from their inception, explicitly derived from tort 
rights.34  Workers’ compensation claimants stand in the historical 
shoes of torts plaintiffs.35  Generally speaking, opt-out implicates 
the complete elimination of a right to a remedy for workplace 
injury,36 while the incremental erosion of rights concerns the 
adequacy of benefits.37  Debates over tort reform often involve tort 
caps, especially caps of noneconomic damages,38 which is a 
question of adequacy.  Workers’ compensation benefits do not 
allow for the possibility of noneconomic benefits,39 and while it 
would be rare in the course of a tort reform debate for someone to 
propose that the amount of a plaintiff’s damages be within the 
exclusive control of a tort defendant, in essence, that is what opt-
out permits.40 
This Article is divided into five parts.  Part II provides 
 
abolishing the collateral source rule. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of 
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 
524, 527 (2005). 
 34.  Jean C. Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the 
Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers’ 
Compensation), 73 CAL. L. REV. 857, 857 (1985). 
 35.  Tort reform has come in waves. 
In the first wave of retrenchment, businesses sought changes in 
rules of law, but . . . the general public, more so than courts, were 
the target of the efforts at persuasion. . . . In the mid-80s, a second 
wave of increased insurance premiums hit multiple sectors, 
including the automotive and health care industries. . . . As in the 
1970s, state legislatures responded to a rapid rise in liability 
insurance rates by enacting measures that capped pain and 
suffering damages, limited punitive damages, restricted the 
collateral source rule, and modified or eliminated joint and several 
liability rules.  In 1986 alone, forty-one of forty-six state legislatures 
enacted some type of tort reform measure. . . . The effort to 
nationalize tort law can be seen as a “third wave” of tort 
retrenchment.  
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of 
Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1029-32 (2005). 
 36.  Texas, as will be seen is the exception. See infra Part III. A. Unlike Oklahoma, 
opt-out employers in Texas are liable in tort. As a practical matter, the tort right in 
Texas is eviscerated by compulsory arbitration. See infra Part III. B. Thus, it is the 
combination of opt-out and arbitration that has, practically speaking, killed workers’ 
tort rights in Texas. 
 37.  See infra Part III. C. 
 38.  See infra note 406 and accompanying text. 
 39.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 40.  The existing structures provide either for payment of the same “forms” of 
benefits (Oklahoma), or impose no duty on the employer to implement a plan with 
benefits (Texas). See infra Parts III. A., III. B. 
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workers’ compensation history and context to assist with 
contextualizing legislative workers’ compensation benefit 
reduction initiatives, including opt-out.  Part III describes the 
roiling workers’ compensation backdrop in three states; Subparts 
A and B address Texas and Oklahoma, presently the only states 
with enacted opt-out statutes,41 thereby representing the most 
dramatic break to date with the historical workers’ compensation 
mode.  Subpart C examines Florida, a state that has allegedly 
incrementally eroded its workers’ compensation benefits to the 
point where the benefits are unreasonable or inadequate.42  Part 
IV of this Article discusses the prospect of restraining state “tort 
reform” through “right to remedy,”43 “open courts,”44 or “quid pro 
quo”45 provisions in state constitutions.  Part V concludes by 
discussing the possibility of restraining states through operation 
of federal due process principles first articulated by the Supreme 
Court in its seminal 1917 opinion in New York Cent. R. Co. v. 
White,46 a case originally upholding the constitutionality of the 
American workers’ compensation model.47  Part V argues that 
White may have been employing an early form of historical due 
process analysis.  The argument contends that, even if White 
cannot be comprehended within the Supreme Court’s historical 
due process modalities, principles of “structural due process” and 
“Lockean provisos” compel a conclusion that our legal order 
should find repugnant inadequate remedies for negligently-
caused physical injury or for accidental injury comprehended 
within the historical workers’ compensation “grand bargain.”48 
II. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ESSENTIAL HISTORY AND 
PRESENT CONTEXT 
The essential theory of workers’ compensation law is 
straightforward.  When a worker is injured, compensation is 
swiftly and, more or less, automatically provided according to 
 
 41.  See infra Parts III. A., III. B. 
 42.  See, e.g., Stahl v. Hialeah Hospital, 160 So.3d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), 
rev granted, 2015 WL 6126944 (challenging as unconstitutional requirement that 
injured workers contribute to medical expense occasioned by work-related injury). 
 43.  See infra Part IV. A. 
 44.  See infra Part IV. A. 
 45.  See infra Part IV. B. 
 46.  243 U.S. 188, 207-09 (1917); accord Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 
U.S. 152, 162-63 (1919). 
 47.  White, 243 U.S. at 209.  
 48.  See infra Part V. A. 
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some pre-existing measure or schedule of benefits.49  This idea is 
not new.  In roughly the last third of the seventeenth century, the 
governing articles of Captain Morgan’s great pirate ships allowed 
that buccaneers wounded and maimed on voyages—presumably 
while plundering fat Spanish galleons—would be compensated 
according to a schedule of listed harms.50  These were early 
glimmerings of the emergence of a workers’ compensation 
insurance “system.”  By the nineteenth century, Otto von 
Bismarck had become an adherent of the view that workers 
injured in the course of employment ought to be compensated 
efficiently and humanely.51  Bismarck’s views were admittedly 
offered in the service of Christendom and born of a fierce 
opposition to socialism and communism;52 nevertheless, they were 
not what a contemporary person might expect from the chancellor 
of “blood and iron.”53  The ideal of workers’ compensation caught 
on across the then-industrializing late nineteenth century world, 
and had spread to the United States by 1910.54  The rudimentary 
concept was that negligence lawsuits would be “exchanged” for 
statutorily pre-determined benefits.55  Workers with viable 
negligence claims would probably receive less compensation 
under a workers’ compensation statute than they might have in 
tort.56  But, on average, many more workers were likely to receive 
some compensation for work-related injuries under workers’ 
compensation statutes than in negligence suits.57  In negligence, 
workers were frequently defeated by affirmative defenses and 
 
 49.  Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1993). 
 50.  STEPHEN TALTY, EMPIRE OF BLUE WATER: CAPTAIN MORGAN’S GREAT PIRATE 
ARMY, THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAS, AND THE CATASTROPHE THAT ENDED THE 
OUTLAW’S BLOODY REIGN 58-59 (2007); N.Y. STATE WORKERS’ COMP. BD., CENTENNIAL 
7 (2014) (citing ALEXANDER O. EXQUEMELIN, THE BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA (1678) 
(translated by Alexis Brown)), http://www.wcb.ny.gov/WCB_Centenial_Booklet.pdf. 
 51.  Otto von Bismarck, Practical Christianity, in 20 THE GERMAN CLASSICS 221, 
228 (1914), http://www.unz.org/Pub/FranckeKuno-1913v10-00221. 
 52.  A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman 57 (1967). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Commentators typically reference the year 1910 as the beginning of the 
workers’ compensation reception period, though it is difficult to fix the date with 
precision. See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of 
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & Econ. 305, 305-06 
(1998) [hereinafter Fishback & Kantor]. 
 55.  Fishback & Kantor, supra note 54 at 305-06.. 
 56.  PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN E. KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: 
THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 4 (2000) [hereinafter FISHBACK & KANTOR, 
A PRELUDE]. 
 57.  Id. 
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ultimately received no compensation58—an outcome made much 
less likely through passage of workers’ compensation statutes. 
By 1917, the Supreme Court had held that a state legislature 
(New York’s) could permissibly substitute workers’ compensation 
benefits for tort remedies, provided that the substitution was not 
“repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”59  
The Court was careful to emphasize that it did not have before it 
a case in which a state was attempting to “suddenly set aside all 
common-law rules respecting liability as between employer and 
employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute.”60  The 
substitute deemed adequate was payment to an injured worker of 
wage-loss indemnity benefits, payment for surgical and medical 
treatment associated with a workplace injury, and, in the event of 
work-related death, payment of funeral expenses and wage-loss 
benefits to the worker’s surviving family.61  The Court also 
recognized that the system would be operated by a public, state 
administrative commission.62  These features, therefore, were 
implicitly deemed to be a reasonable substitute for a tort suit. 
At the present moment in history, the continued viability of 
the workers’ compensation tort substitute, the quid pro quo, 
endorsed by White, is in question.  The two poles of argument in 
constant operation will be familiar to many readers.  On the one 
hand, it might be argued that workers’ compensation laws are 
tantamount to “ordinary” common law rules, modifiable at will by 
a rational legislature.63  On the other hand, it might be contended 
that the transition to workers’ compensation, a socially massive 
undertaking involving historically important remedies for 
personal injury, would not have been acceptable in the absence of 
a widespread understanding that substitute benefits under the 
system could continue to be available and “reasonable.”64 
This quid pro quo debate is perplexing but not academic.  
 
 58.  Affirmative defenses that became known as the “unholy trinity”: assumption 
of the risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule. See DUFF, supra note 
23, at 371. 
 59.  White, 243 U.S. at 208. The logical corollary, of course, is that such a 
substitution could be repugnant. 
 60.  Id. at 201. The logical corollary is that such a sudden set-aside without a 
“reasonably just substitute” could be problematic, though on what Fourteenth 
Amendment theory readily applicable in 1917 is not clear. 
 61.  Id. at 193. 
 62.  Id. at 194. 
 63.  Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 144 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 64.  See generally Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001); see 
infra Part IV. 
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Some state legislatures seem poised to authorize wholesale 
substitution of employer-created alternative benefit plans for 
workers’ compensation remedies.65  Oklahoma has already done 
so.66  Apart from opt-out, other states have demonstrated a 
willingness to allow significant modifications of workers’ 
compensation rights by reducing the amount or duration of 
medical and wage-loss indemnity benefits.67  Oklahoma’s abrupt 
embarkation on the opt-out route instantly generated litigation.68  
On the other hand, over time, Florida has made significant but 
incremental reductions to its workers’ compensation benefits, 
provoking periodic litigation resistance.69  The Florida model of 
incremental erosion is not unique.  The Demolition of Workers’ 
Comp,70 a recent and much-discussed article produced jointly by 
ProPublica and National Public Radio, contends that, “[o]ver the 
past decade, state after state has been dismantling America’s 
workers’ comp system with disastrous consequences for many of 
the hundreds of thousands of people who suffer serious injuries at 
work each year.”71 
On the contemporary opt-out front, the popular press has 
reported that a corporate-funded lobbying group, the Association 
for Responsible Alternatives to Workers’ Compensation 
(“ARAWC”), stated that “the corporations ultimately want to 
change workers’ comp laws in all 50 states.”72  On its website, the 
ARAWC discusses Tennessee as a state in which opt-out is 
actively under construction.73  An “Employee Injury Benefit 
 
 65.  See Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15; see also supra note 16. 
 66.  See infra Part III. B. 
 67.  Emily A. Spieler & John F. Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between 
Work-Related Disability and Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 55 AM. J. 
INDUS. MED. 487, 498-502 (2012) (discussing benefit reductions and other obstacles to 
employee pursuit of legitimate workers’ compensation claims). 
 68.  See infra Part III. B.; see generally Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924 (Okla. 2013). 
 69.  See infra Part III. C.; see generally Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 
WL 6685226, at ¶ 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural grounds). 
 70.  Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp, 
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-of-
workers-compensation [hereinafter Grabell & Berkes, Demolition]. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Molly Redden, Walmart, Lowe’s, Safeway, and Nordstrom Are Bankrolling a 
Nationwide Campaign to Gut Workers’ Comp, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 26, 2015, 10:47 
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/03/arawc-walmart-campaign-against-
workers-compensation (citing Stephanie K. Jones, Group Aims to Create Alternatives 
to Workers’ Comp State-by-State, Ins. Journal, Nov. 10, 2014, 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/11/10/346291.htm); see also 
Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15. 
 73.  See Tennessee Option, ASS’N FOR RESPONSIBLE ALT. TO WORKERS’ COMP., 
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Alternative” was introduced in the Tennessee Senate in 2015 but 
did not pass.74  A second attempt was made in the spring of 2016, 
but the bill failed, possibly due to an ethics controversy 
surrounding the bill’s sponsor.75  ARAWC’s materials suggest that 
it has national ambitions,76 and South Carolina appears to be the 
group’s next target of opportunity.77 
Observers of workers’ compensation reform acknowledge 
that its overall purpose is to save businesses money.78  The 
 
http://arawc.org/state-priorities/tennessee/ (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 74.  See S. B. 721, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015). It is anticipated 
that the bill will be reintroduced with revisions in 2016. Amy O’Connor Tennessee 
Workers Comp Opt-Out Legislation Revised, Ready for Next Session, INS. JOURNAL, 
June 1, 2015, 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/06/01/370065/htm. By all 
accounts, the proposed Tennessee bill is more extreme than Oklahoma’s statute. 
[I]t eliminates an entire genre of benefits. Indeed, the bill’s 
mandated plan benefits do not provide for any permanency benefits: 
No permanent partial or permanent total benefits. It eliminates 
lifetime medical benefits, capping medical at $300,000, thereby 
jeopardizing treatment of workers with the most serious injuries. 
Nor are there funeral benefits, nor for ancillary benefits common in 
workers’ compensation systems—van and home modification, 
custodial care, hearing aids, and artificial limbs.  
David B. Torrey, Appendix B: Statement of the American Insurance Association: 
Legislation Permitting Employer Opt-Out of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation 
System, Mar. 9, 2015, in The Opt-Out of Workers’ Compensation Legislation in the 
Southern States, Keynote Speaker at MCLE New England: 16th Annual Workers’ 
Comp. Conference 2015 (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.davetorrey.info/files/Torrey.MCLE._Mass_Opt-out.10.26.15final.pdf. 
 75.  See Stephanie Goldberg, Did texting scandal derail Tennessee workers comp 
opt-out effort?, BUS. INS. (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://businessinsurance.com/artice//20160204/NEWS08/160209901/did-texting-
scandal-derail-tennessee-workers-comp-opt-out-effort?tags=%7C92%7C329%7C304. 
 76.  From the AWARC’s website: 
The Association for Responsible Alternatives to Workers’ 
Compensation (ARAWC) is a national organization comprised of 
employers, workers’ compensation system providers, and industry 
experts dedicated to enacting state workers’ compensation 
alternatives (an Option) that deliver better outcomes to employees, 
while giving employers a choice in how they manage their injury 
benefits programs. 
ARAWC, About Us, http://arawc.org/about/ (last visited May 5, 2016). 
 77.  Amy O’Connor, South Carolina Jumps Aboard Workers’ Comp Alternative 
Bandwagon, INS. JOURNAL (June 10, 2015), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/06/10/371088.htm. 
 78.  Workers’ Compensation Opt-Out: Can Privatization Work?, NEW STREET 
GROUP (Nov. 2012), https://www.sedgwik.com/docs/pressrelease/WCOpt-
OutStudy.pdf. Opt-out proponents complain that the system has become too expensive 
because employers lack control over provider selection, enforcement of “evidence-
based” medicine is insufficient, pharmaceutical abuse and use of opioids has been 
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
136    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
essential issue then, is the legal limit of business subsidization by 
the states.  A business environment without rules—without 
workers’ compensation or tort—is clearly a much cheaper place to 
operate, and it is apparent that the opt-out movement has its 
sights set on elimination of an employer’s obligation to pay 
permanent incapacity benefits.79  The question is whether there 
are any constitutional limitations on that subsidization and, 
therefore, any principled limit on legislative privatization of 
public rights.  In the workers’ compensation context, White once 
appeared to require that tort substitutions for workplace injury 
be “reasonably just” to pass judicial muster.80  If none of White 
remains viable, it may be a short road to judicial authorization of 
any legislative reduction of personal injury remedies, as states 
race to the bottom and the federal courts refuse to intervene.  If 
money is the predominant measure of rationality, the lowest cost 
workers’ compensation or tort system will always be, at a 
minimum, rational.81 
III. A TALE OF THREE STATES: TEXAS, OKLAHOMA, AND 
FLORIDA 
A.  TEXAS 
Texas is unique among the states,82 with a workers’ 
 
inadequately curtailed, the complexity of terminating temporary disability is 
excessive, permanent partial disability awards have been pervasive, and dispute 
resolution procedures are expensive and cumbersome. Id. at 6. 
 79.  With respect to the elimination of permanent incapacity benefits, see infra 
note 176 and accompanying text. In 2013, the direct costs of workers’ compensation 
injuries were roughly $60 billion. See 2016 Liberty Mutual Workplace Safety Index, 
LIBERTY MUT. RESEARCH INST. FOR SAFETY, 
https://www.libertymutualgroup.com/about-liberty-mutual-site/research-institute-
site/Documents/2016%20WSI.pdf (last visited May 26, 2016). 
 80.  See White, supra, note 46 and accompanying text. 
 81.  Cf. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 626 (“Whatever its advantages, a society 
without a law for the redress of private wrongs may be a society more prone than ours 
to accept a relatively thin, Holmesian notion of legal obligation, a less robust civil 
society, and a more statist conception of how government interacts with its citizens.”). 
 82.  See Meagan Flynn, Don’t Fall Down on the Job in Texas: Employers Don’t 
Have to Provide Injury Coverage, HOUSTON PRESS (Feb. 2, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.houstonpress.com/news/don-t-fall-down-on-the-job-in-texas-employers-
don-t-have-to-provide-injury-coverage-8120319. Texas is not the only current opt-out 
state. Oklahoma, soon to be discussed, is the second such state. It may technically be 
correct to say that Oklahoma is not a “true” opt-out state because it formally requires 
employers to “comply” with its workers’ compensation statute authorizing opt-out. The 
difference is semantical, however, as the article will describe, the statute provides 
employers two methods to not comply with the “traditional” law: opt-out and 
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compensation system that has allowed employers to opt out of the 
system entirely since its conception in the early twentieth 
century.83  More precisely, while several other states initially 
enacted elective statutes (like the one in Texas), they all 
subsequently switched to compulsory systems.84  Employers in 
Texas, including large employers, routinely opt-out.85  What 
makes Texas paradigmatic is not its “new” approach but its 
perennial status as a deregulatory model.86  Critics of the Texas 
system allege that: 
Most Texans who are outside the workers’ comp system—
more than a million people—do get private occupational 
insurance from their employers.  But those plans aren’t regulated 
by the state and can be crafted to sharply limit employees’ 
benefits, legal rights and health care choices.  Only 41 percent of 
the plans include death benefits, for example, according to state 
surveys.87 
Texas has been at or near the top of national workplace death 
rates in recent years,88 and explanations abound as to why this is 
so.89  Whatever the reasons, there have been dramatic industrial 
mishaps involving opt-out employers.  For example, one of the 
underpublicized facts revealed during investigation of the 
 
arbitration. See infra Part III. B. 
 83.  In Texas, opt-out employers may either withdraw from the system entirely 
and “go bare,” or establish an “alternative benefit plan,” providing a form of putatively 
contractual benefits that need not conform in any manner to the statutory workers’ 
compensation system. See infra Part III. A. 
 84.  Initially, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, many workers’ 
compensation statutes throughout the United States were elective. Thus, employers 
in several states were permitted to “not opt in,” which was the functional equivalent 
of opting out. States structuring their statutes in this way did so out of concern that 
the U.S. Supreme Court would strike down compulsory workers’ compensation 
systems on due process grounds. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, 
at 93, 104. 
 85.  COSTCO provides a ready example of a large employer taking advantage of 
the opportunity to provide a non-statutory injury reimbursement option. See New 
Street Group, supra note 78, at 27. 
 86.  Jason Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation: A Model of Innovation?, 
2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 323, 339 (2011). 
 87.  Jay Root, Hurting for Work, TEXAS TRIBUNE (June 29, 2014), 
http://apps.texastribune.org/hurting-for-work/. 
 88.  See Bill Bowen, As Workplace Deaths Fall Nationally, They Remain 
Stubbornly High in Texas, DALLAS MORNING News (Sept. 15, 2012), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20120915-as-workplace-deaths-fall-
nationally-they-remain-stubbornly-high-in-texas.ece. 
 89.  See, e.g., James Gordon, Death on the Job: Texas Workers More Likely to Die 
Than Counterparts Elsewhere, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Aug. 16, 2014), 
http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/2014_workplace/. 
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
138    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
devastating fertilizer facility explosion that rocked West Texas in 
April 2013—a blast that registered 2.1 on the Richter scale90—
was that the company running the plant was a “nonsubscriber,” 
an opt-out employer.91  Although none of the plant’s workers were 
injured or killed in the blast,92 the company would have suffered 
no heightened workers’ compensation expense had those workers 
become victims.  Despite having the regular practice of storing the 
explosive substance, ammonium nitrate, on its premises, the 
plant was insured for only one million dollars.93  Damages 
resulting from the accident were estimated at 100 million 
dollars.94  Under-deterrence and under-insurance were, in other 
words, a pervasive feature of the plant’s operations, and opt-out 
was intertwined with this unsafe profile.95 
One of the ameliorating features of the Texas opt-out system 
is that employees of opt-out employers retain the right to sue their 
employers in tort for workplace injuries.96  However, opt-out 
employers providing their employees an alternative benefit 
plan—a benefit not required under Texas law, which permits 
employers to “go bare” and provide no wage loss or medical 
benefits at all97—may effectively require their employees to waive 
 
 90.  Ian Urbina et al., After Plant Explosion, Texas Remains Wary of Regulation, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/us/after-plant-
explosion-texas-remains-wary-of-
regulation.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all. 
 91.  Arthur D. Postal, West Fertilizer Blast Spotlights Texas Workers Comp 
System, Okla. Legislation, Property Casualty 360° (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/04/24/west-fertilizer-blast-spotlight-texas-
workers-com. 
 92.  The explosion killed fifteen non-employees and injured two hundred others. 
Doug J. Swanson & Reese Dunklin, West Fertilizer Co. Was Insured For Only $1 




 93.  Id. 
 94.  An amount a mere two hundred and fifty thousand dollars higher than the 
seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars that is required for a company to insure a 
single egg truck on the roadways. Id. 
 95.  The West explosion obviously cannot be thought to reflect the erosion of a 
historically non-mandatory Texas system. However, because in Texas a non-subscriber 
is authorized to either develop an alternative plan regulated by ERISA, or to “go bare” 
in hard economic times, the incentive for underinsurance seems high. 
 96.  See Sheena Harrison, Texas Employers Still Opting Out Despite Lawsuits, 
BUSINESS INSURANCE (Jan. 17, 2016, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160117/NEWS08/301179995/texas-
employers-still-opting-out-of-states-workers-compensation. 
 97.  See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2015). 
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
2016] STATE’S AUTHORITY TO OPT-OUT 139 
a tort suit and participate in arbitration as a condition of 
employment.98  While pre-injury waivers of the right to sue are 
forbidden under Texas law,99 the Texas courts have held that the 
state may not prohibit the waivers then accompanied by a promise 
to arbitrate as a result of preemption by the Federal Arbitration 
Act.100  As one commentator has noted: 
[I]f an employer can secure waivers from its employees 
before injuries, it can effectively neutralize the threat 
of negligence suits.  It can thus secure the principal 
benefit of a workers’ compensation system, namely 
near immunity from employer’s liability lawsuits, 
while at the same time providing stingy or no benefits 
to the employees in return.101 
In Texas, opting out of the workers’ compensation system 
requires only that an employer notify the Texas Workers’ 
Compensation Division of the Department of Insurance of its opt-
out status and that it inform employees at the time of hire of the 
status.102  An employer must also conspicuously post notices of its 
opt-out status in the workplace.103  In 2014, 33 percent of Texas 
employers opted out of the workers’ compensation system.104  An 
estimated 20 percent of Texas private-sector employees 
(representing approximately 1.9 million employees in 2014) 
worked for non-subscribing employers.105  In 2014, two-thirds of 
non-subscribing employers, representing about 22 percent of 
Texas employers overall, provided no alternative benefit plan.106  
However, because Texas opt-out employers providing alternative 
benefit plans tend to be large, they employ 75 percent of the opt-
out employee population.107  Thus, in Texas, 25 percent of the 1.9 
 
 98.  See Harrison, supra note 96. 
 99.  TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e) (West 2015). 
 100.  More precisely, the FAA would require a court to grant a motion to compel 
arbitration and either dismiss or hold in abeyance a post-injury lawsuit. On the ever 
encroaching phenomenon of arbitration, see Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and 
Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 
2940, 2942-43 (2015). 
 101.  Ohana, supra note 86, at 355. 
 102.  TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2015). 
 103.  TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2015). 
 104.  TEX. DEP’T OF INS., SETTING THE STANDARD: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
THE 2005 LEGISLATIVE REFORMS ON THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM, 
2014 RESULTS, at 118 (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/dwc/documents/2014regbiennialrpt.pdf. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
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million opt-out employees—475,000 employees—are not covered 
by alternative benefit plans nor by the workers’ compensation 
statute. 
Concerning the alternative benefit plans for those who are 
covered by such mechanisms, employers have no obligation to 
match or even approach the level of statutory workers’ 
compensation benefits that would otherwise be required by law.108  
In the words of former Chief Justice Hardberger of the Texas 
Fourth Court of Appeals: 
A non-subscribing employer has unfettered discretion 
in determining the amount of benefits it will provide 
employees under an alternative plan.  In exchange for 
these benefits, regardless of how minimal, the worker 
is prevented from presenting his claims to a jury by 
being required either to waive his right to sue or to 
submit his claims to binding arbitration.  This is 
unacceptable.109 
Under the Texas system of workers’ compensation 
arbitration, figures show that employers require their employees 
to sign an arbitration agreement for personal injury before an 
injury has occurred, and that three-quarters of employers 
 
 108.  Phil Hardberger, C.J., Texas Workers’ Compensation: A Ten Year Survey – 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 7 (2000). 
 109.  Id. See also Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation, supra note 86, at 
341-42. 
Of the 52 percent of non-subscribing employers that paid 
occupational injury benefits in 2008, only 70 percent covered 
medical costs. Of those that covered medical costs, 63 percent 
covered expenses for as long as they were medically necessary, while 
the remaining 37 percent capped medical expenses either with a 
dollar limit, a time limit, or both. Applying these percentages to the 
larger universe of non-subscribers, the total percentage of non-
subscribers that provided a medical expense benefit to injured 
employees in 2008 was approximately 36 percent, with 
approximately 23 percent of non-subscribers providing benefits for 
as long as medically necessary and 13 percent providing benefits up 
to a time or dollar limit. The numbers are similar for wage 
replacement benefits. Approximately 35 percent of all non-
subscribers paid occupational injury benefits and 68 percent of 
those non-subscribers paid wage replacement benefits in 2008. Of 
these, 57 percent paid wage replacement benefits for the entire 
duration of the employee’s lost time; the remaining 43 percent paid 
wage replacement benefits subject to a durational or dollar limit. 
Again, applying these percentages to the larger universe of non-
subscribers, only about 20 percent of non-subscribers provided wage 
replacement benefits for the entire duration of their employees’ lost 
time.  
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requiring arbitration knew the arbitrator who presided at 
arbitration hearings, and that in half of those instances the 
arbitrator was employed by the employer.110 
Based on these patchwork features, it could be reasonably 
questioned whether workers’ compensation actually exists in 
Texas as a rights-based system.  However, because Texas never 
accepted a compulsory workers’ compensation system,111 it is 
difficult to contend that a societal grand bargain was breached.  
Both employers and employees have been able to opt out of (or not 
opt in to) Texas workers’ compensation from its inception.112  To 
the extent that employees are denied the opportunity of a 
reasonable remedy for workplace injury, the question of whether 
the Texas system is constitutionally adequate remains open.  On 
the one hand, negligence suits remain available to employees of 
opt-out employers.  However, this raises the specter of the 
cumbersome and expensive tort system, replete with the same 
affirmative defenses that spurred the creation of workers’ 
compensation.  At the same time, operation of compulsory 
arbitration makes it extremely uncertain that an injured worker 
will make it to trial. 
B.  OKLAHOMA 
Oklahoma is the most recent state to adopt a workers’ 
compensation system that authorizes opt-out.113  Unlike Texas, 
Oklahoma requires employers either to formally participate in the 
state’s traditional workers’ compensation system—by obtaining 
insurance or becoming self-insured—or to submit for state 
approval an alternative benefit plan.114  Thus, employers in 
 
 110.  Ohana, supra note 86, at 343-44. As of 2014, it appeared that seventy-nine 
percent of non-subscribers using arbitration (14 percent in 2014) required their 
employees to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of hire. Approximately 
sixty-six percent of large non-subscriber employers use arbitration. See EMPLOYER 
PARTICIPATION IN THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM: 2014 ESTIMATES, at 
38, TEXAS DEP’T OF INSURANCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RESEARCH AND 
EVALUATION GROUP (2014), available at 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/wcreg/documents/nonsub.pdf. Curiously, tracking of 
employers with ongoing relationships with arbitrators has not been undertaken in the 
2014 Texas Report the 2008 version of which formed the corpus of Ohana’s findings, 
see Ohana, supra note 86, at 344. 
 111.  Ohana, supra note 86, at 339. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See, e.g., Pilkington v. Doak, No. PR-113662, 3 (Okla. 2015) (review denied). 
 114.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, §§ 3, 202 (West 2015). 
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
142    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
Oklahoma may not “go bare.”115 
Oklahoma employees, compelled to participate in alternative 
benefit pans, continue to be bound by the exclusive remedy rule.116  
Therefore, unlike the situation in Texas, Oklahoma employees 
participating in an alternative benefit plan (who are therefore not 
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits) are also not entitled 
to bring tort suits.117  This presents a rather stark quid pro quo 
problem because the original rationale for relinquishment of tort 
rights was the reciprocal conferral on employees of generous 
workers’ compensation benefits.  Oklahoma employees of opt-out 
employers have lost a functional legal right to a remedy for 
workplace injury.118  Generally, just as in Texas, workers’ 
compensation benefits may not lawfully be waived under the 
Oklahoma Act.119  However, and also as is the case in Texas,120 
employers may enter into agreements with employees waiving 
workers’ compensation benefits in lieu of arbitration.121  And, 
such agreements are probably enforceable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act.122 
Some background is required to grasp these developments.  
In 2013, the Oklahoma legislature abrogated the former Workers’ 
Compensation Code123 and replaced it with three interrelated 
statutes: the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act,124 the 
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act,125 and the Workers’ 
 
 115.  They may, however, enter into agreements with employees to arbitrate 
workers’ compensation claims under a discrete section of the Workers’ Compensation 
Act called, “The Workers’ Compensation Arbitration Act.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-
85A, § 300 (West 2015). 
 116.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 209(A) (West 2015). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  The counter to this contention is that employers may be bound to comply with 
the terms of the alternative plans they do provide if the plans are covered by ERISA. 
As a practical matter, this amounts to a requirement that an employer comply with a 
plan the terms of which it unilaterally determines, which is not an obligation 
comporting with usual conceptions of a “right.” 
 119.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 8 (West 2015). 
 120.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 301 (West 2015). 
 121.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 304 (West 2015). 
 122.  The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the question. See, e.g., 
Morales v. Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 319 (2010) (cert. denied). See Brief for 
Guadalupe Morales as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, In re Morales, 2010 
WL 2912538 (2010) (No. 10-134) (arguing among other things that the 10th 
Amendment prevents Congress from legislating in traditional state areas). 
 123.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A (2015). 
 124.  Id. at § 1. 
 125.  Id. at § 200. 
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Compensation Arbitration Act.126  The second of these statutes, 
the Employee Injury Benefit Act, would allow “certain employers 
to adopt and administer benefit plans consistent with the 
Administrative Act, and the Workers’ Arbitration Compensation 
Act.”127  However, appeals of benefit determinations under the 
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act are made to a private 
employer’s internal adjudication committee rather than to a state 
or other public official.128  Following internal review of the 
committee decision, an aggrieved employee may appeal to the 
state Workers’ Compensation Commission. 
This statutory requirement assumes that any occupational 
injury plan not covered by the workers’ compensation statute—
that is, an alternative benefit plan—is covered by ERISA.  
However, this remains an open question.129  The Employee Injury 
 
 126.  Id. at § 300. 
 127.  Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924, 924 (Okla. 2013). 
 128.  Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 211(B)(1-4) (2015). At least one justice of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court would find this provision unconstitutional on its face. 
Coates, 316 P.3d at 929 (Reif, J., dissenting in part). 
 129.  ERISA provides: 
The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan” mean 
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter 
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or 
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of 
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the 
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or 
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, 
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, 
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, 
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services. 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). The Act in relevant part exempts from ERISA any 
employee benefit plan “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable 
workmen’s compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance 
laws.” Id. § 1003(b)(3). 
  ERISA states: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of 
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate 
to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title 
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. 
Id. § 1144(a). However, ERISA exempts in relevant parts any employee benefit plan 
“maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s 
compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws.” Id. 
§ 1003(b)(3). The underlying logical assumption is that creating an alternative benefit 
plan is precisely for the purpose of not complying with a “workmen’s compensation 
law.” Yet opt-out plans are only permissible if compliance with the Oklahoma 
Employee Injury Benefit Act is achieved, and it is arguable whether that statute is a 
“workmen’s compensation law.”  
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Benefit Act also requires that the Commission “rely on the record 
established by the internal appeal process and use an objective 
standard of review that is not arbitrary or capricious.”130  The 
ability of an employer to opt out is liberally authorized.  The 
employer is required only to provide notice to state officials and 
employees,131 develop a written benefit plan,132 post a bond of 
$1,500,133 and provide additional assurances to insurance officials 
that it has sufficient assets “in an amount determined by the 
Commissioner which shall be at least an average of the yearly 
claims for the last three (3) years.”134  In short, it is meant to be—
and is—very easy for an employer to opt out of workers’ 
compensation by adopting an alternative benefit plan in 
Oklahoma.135 
Procedural innovations, such as those discussed above, do 
not, of course, immediately implicate the quid pro quo, which is 
usually regarded as a question of the adequacy of the substantive 
exchange of rights and remedies.136  The procedural due process 
implications in the design of employer-dominated 
“committees,”137 coupled with limited judicial review are plain 
enough, but are beyond the scope of this discussion.138  One is 
 
 130.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 211, B., 6 (2015). Notably, this standard of review 
affords courts less discretion in reviewing plan decisions than they would have in 
reviewing an agency decision under the Oklahoma Administrative Workers’ 
Compensation Act, which provides traditional APA review. See id. § 78(A). 
 131.  The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act provides that the employer’s 
notice must be provided to employees at the time of hire, and such employers shall 
notify employees “that it does not carry workers’ compensation insurance coverage and 
that such coverage has terminated or been cancelled.” Id. at § 202(H), (I). 
 132.  Id. § 202(A)(2). 
 133.  Id. § 202(B). 
 134.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 204(B)(2)(a)(1) (2015). 
 135.  However, as has been mentioned, it is even easier for an employer to opt-out 
of the system in Texas as of this writing. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 
2013). 
 136.  Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 1285, 1287 (Pa. 1990) (“Where statutory 
remedies are provided, the procedure prescribed by the statute must be strictly 
pursued, to the exclusion of other methods of redress.”) (internal quotations omitted) 
(citation omitted). 
 137.  Both Oklahoma and federal courts have insisted that a fundamental element 
of due process is a fair and impartial trial. Clark v. Bd. of Educ. Of Indiana School 
Dist. No. 89, 32 P.3d 851, 854 (Okla. 2001). This includes a neutral and detached 
decision maker. Id. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (“Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally 
unacceptable, but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness.’”) (citation omitted). 
 138.  In a recent successful administrative challenge to the Injury Benefit Act, 
procedural due process arguments did not factor into the Workers’ Compensation 
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inclined to agree with Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Combs 
in Coates v. Fallin,139 the first state Supreme Court case 
challenging the constitutionality of the Employee Injury Benefit 
Act.140  A number of “disparate treatment” issues under this 
unilateral employer system will emerge but must await future 
judicial analysis.141  Nevertheless, facial quid pro quo challenges, 
alleging both inadequate procedure and substance, appear 
unavoidable and have already begun.142  Furthermore, as 
elsewhere in the law, what might initially seem procedural can 
have a profoundly substantive impact on a case.  As Thomas Main 
recently wrote, procedure is a tool of power and can negate 
substantive rights.143 
Nevertheless, with respect to substance, the alternative 
benefit plan an employer is permitted to provide (even as it 
maintains the exclusive remedy rule)144 is as follows: 
The benefit plan shall provide for payment of the same 
forms of benefits included in the Administrative 
Workers’ Compensation Act for temporary total 
disability, temporary partial disability, permanent 
partial disability, vocational rehabilitation, 
permanent total disability, disfigurement, amputation 
 
Commission’s conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, 
Inc., CM-2014-11060L (Okla. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n) (Feb. 26, 2016); see also 
Michael C. Duff, Workers’ Comp Agency Declares Oklahoma Opt-Out Statute 
Unconstitutional, LEXISNEXIS NEWSROOM: WORKERS COMP. LAW (Feb. 28, 2016, 11:31 
PM). 
 139.  316 P.3d 924 (Okla. 2013). 
 140.  See id. at 924-25 (deciding constitutional issues as matters of first 
impression). 
 141.  “As the law has not yet taken effect, it is unclear exactly how these issues will 
manifest themselves in future cases or controversies, but it is necessary to 
acknowledge the constitutional problems these Acts will produce when claimants 
begin to receive disparate treatment in their recourse to the law based upon 
decisions made by their employers.”  Id. at 925 (Combs, J., concurring). 
 142.  A leading Oklahoma practitioner informs the author that multiple cases in 
Oklahoma are pending that charge legislative violations of the “grand bargain”/quid 
pro quo. See McAnany, Van Cleave & Philips, P.A., Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation 
17, 19, 20, 21 (2015), 
http://www.mvplaw.com/post/articles/Oklahoma%20Materials(1).pdf (listing Duck v. 
Morgan Tie, No. 113,601 (Okla.), Torres v. Seaboard Foods, No. 113-649 (Okla.), 
Deason v. Integris Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 113,648 (Okla.), Mullendore v. Mercy Hosp. 
Ardmore, No. 113,560 (Okla.), Robinson v. Fairview Fellowship Home, No. 113,735 
(Okla.), Brown v. Claims Mgmt. Res., No. 113,609 (Okla.), and Nowlin v. Medicalodges, 
Inc., No. 113,607 (Okla.) as pending appeals before the Oklahoma Supreme Court). 
 143.  Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV., 801, 818 (2010). 
 144.  See DUFF, supra note 23, at 326. 
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or permanent total loss of use of a scheduled member, 
death and medical benefits as a result of an 
occupational injury, on a no-fault basis, with the same 
statute of limitations, and with dollar, percentage, and 
duration limits that are at least equal to or greater 
than the dollar, percentage, and duration limits 
contained in Sections 45, 46 and 47 of this title.  For 
this purpose, the standards for determination of 
average weekly wage, death beneficiaries, and 
disability under the Administrative Workers’ 
Compensation Act shall apply under the Oklahoma 
Employee Injury Benefit Act; but no other provision of 
the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act 
defining covered injuries, medical management, 
dispute resolution or other process, funding, notices or 
penalties shall apply or otherwise be controlling under 
the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act, unless 
expressly incorporated.145 
A reading of this language might initially show that the 
substantive core of the traditional Act has been preserved.146  
However, this preliminary conclusion will not withstand scrutiny 
and ignores the depth, range, and subtlety of substantive disputes 
that arise in workers’ compensation cases.  For example, the 
provision provides for the same “forms” of benefits for various 
categories of disability.147  Perhaps this means that both medical 
and indemnity benefits are the only benefits available under the 
Act.  Or, perhaps it means something more.  In any event, the 
language does not specify amounts of damage for degrees of 
incapacity, as would be the case in a workers’ compensation 
statute.  In a similar vein, there may be no question that, if an 
employee is totally incapacitated for work, that employee would 
be entitled to a benefit amount based on the average weekly wage 
at the time of injury, as traditionally calculated, and for the 
duration of the incapacity;148 yet, the pivotal issue in workers’ 
compensation claims is often causation.149  Causation lurks 
behind seemingly banal phrases such as “covered injuries,” 
 
 145.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015). 
 146.  The statute appears to incorporate most of the disability benefits structure of 
the Act. That is, the provision seems to require alternative benefits to pay permanent 
and temporary benefits that are both total and partial. Id. § 45(A)-(D). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. § 45(C)-(D). 
 149.  82 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TO WRONGFUL 
DISCHARGE § 194 (2d ed. 2013) (hereinafter “AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE”). 
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“medical management,” and “dispute resolution,” all of which are 
explicitly unmoored from the traditional Act.150  Thus, a causation 
dispute will often involve sharply contested medical evidence151 
that will now be weighed, credited, or rejected by employer-
designated fact finders subject to ultra-deferential judicial 
review.152 
In addition, alternative plans are not required to adhere to 
the traditional Act’s provisions on “medical management.”153  This 
exemption apparently refers to the traditional Act’s requirement 
that an injured worker be afforded a right to choose his or her own 
doctor.154  As observers of injury law are aware, parties to many 
contested cases provide fact finders with medical opinions that 
are diametrically opposed on, for example, the cause and duration 
of a claimant’s disability.155  Presumably under an alternative 
benefit plan, an employer would have discretion as to whether to 
pay for the services or to accept into evidence the medical opinion 
of a claimant’s treating doctor.  Thus, an employer is in a position 
to send an injured worker to his preferred physician and the issue 
of dueling doctors or independent medical examiners becomes 
extinguished.156 
Paragraph C. of the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act 
states: 
The benefit plan may provide for lump-sum payouts 
that are, as reasonably determined by the 
administrator of such plan appointed by the qualified 
employer, actuarially equivalent to expected future 
payments.  The benefit plan may also provide for 
settlement agreements; provided, however, any 
settlement agreement by a covered employee shall be 
voluntary, entered into not earlier than the tenth 
business day after the date of the initial report of 
injury, and signed after the covered employee has 
received a medical evaluation from a nonemergency 
care doctor, with any waiver of rights being 
 
 150.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 203(B) (2015). 
 151.  AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 149, at § 543. 
 152.  Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924, 926 (Okla. 2013) (Combs, J., dissenting). 
 153.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015). 
 154.  “Medical management” is a vague term. One assumes it means overall 
management of a patient by a doctor. See, e.g., Tortorelli v. Mercy Health Center, 242 
P.3d 549, 556 n.7 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 2010). 
 155.  See DUFF, supra note 23, at 255-56. 
 156.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015). Spieler & Burton, supra note 67, 
at 501-02. 
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conspicuous and on the face of the agreement.  The 
benefit plan shall pay benefits without regard to 
whether the covered employee, the qualified employer, 
or a third party caused the occupational injury; and 
provided further, that the benefit plan shall provide 
eligibility to participate in and provide the same forms 
and levels of benefits to all Oklahoma employees of the 
qualified employer.  The Administrative Workers’ 
Compensation Act shall not define, restrict, expand or 
otherwise apply to a benefit plan.157 
In other words, an administrator appointed solely by the 
employer determines whether the employee’s lump sum payments 
are “actuarially equivalent” to future benefits.  The provision 
affords no limitations on the selection or qualifications of the 
administrator.  Such a determination would typically involve a 
cautious exercise of judgment in making accurate assessments of 
the expected lifetime value of a claim, and again in calculating the 
present value of that claim.158  These determinations can be 
complex and subject to dispute.159  Additionally, the text of the 
provision gives no indication that, subsequent to execution of the 
agreement, the settlement must be approved by a public official, 
or that an aggrieved injured worker could obtain judicial review 
of the agreement.  Furthermore, a plan may authorize settlement 
agreements and waivers as early as ten business days after an 
injury,160 when the magnitude of an injury may still not be fully 
known.  This presents problems similar to pre-injury waivers of 
injury.  While waivers must be conspicuous, nothing in the 
provision requires that waivers be knowing or intelligent.161  An 
employee might easily sign away all rights before becoming aware 
of the magnitude of an injury and, therefore, will have limited 
access to judicial review thereafter.162 
To say that a system like Oklahoma’s might provoke legal 
challenge is an understatement.  To say that the Oklahoma 
system might get “bad press” is obvious.  However, it remains true 
that the Oklahoma legislature enacted the system, and courts do 
 
 157.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(C) (2015). 
 158.  DUFF, supra note 23, at 190. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 203(C) (2015). 
 161.  Valles v. Daniel Constr. Co., 589 S.W.2d 911 913 (Tenn. 1979). 
 162.  Of course, it is somewhat unclear what rights could be waived since so much 
of the traditional Act may be excluded from an injury benefit plan. See OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(C) (2015). 
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not lightly set aside the acts of legislatures.163  Further, the 
system is not irrational if the measure of rationality is saving 
businesses money.  However, if the rights being displaced by the 
Employee Injury Benefit Act are fundamental, or even “very 
important,” such that the level of scrutiny applied by courts is 
higher than that applied when reviewing merely economic 
regulation,164 the Oklahoma system may continue to be quite 
vulnerable to legal attack because of the high risk that, through 
its operation, injured workers will be deprived of reasonable 
remedies.165 
C.  FLORIDA 
In some states, critics have alleged that the incremental 
erosion of workers’ compensation benefits has resulted in 
abandonment of the workers’ compensation quid pro quo or grant 
bargain.166  In those states, legislatures have significantly scaled 
back the amount or duration of indemnity benefits and limited 
medical treatment of work-related injuries.167  In these erosional 
 
 163.  Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1897). 
 164.  See infra Part IV. B. 
 165.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 166.  Grabell & Berkes, Demolition, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 167.  As a bill introduced in the House of Representatives in 2009, but not passed, 
recited: 
Since [1972], changes in reductions in State workers’ compensation 
laws have increased the inadequacy and inequitable levels of 
workers’ compensation benefits. Serious questions exist concerning 
the fairness and adequacy of present workers’ compensation laws in 
light of the growth of the economy, changing nature of the labor 
force, misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and 
as leased employees, as well as erosion of remedies for the bad faith 
handling and delay in payment of benefits and medical care to 
workers and their families, increases in medical knowledge, 
changes in the hazards associated with various employment, new 
risks to health and safety created by new technology, and increases 
in the general level of wages and in the cost of living. 
National Commission on State Workers’ Compensation Laws Act of 2009, H.R. 635, 
11th Cong. § 2(3) (2009).  
  Recently, stories in the popular press have been arguing the same point: 
Since 2003, legislators in 33 states have passed workers’ comp laws 
that reduce benefits or make it more difficult for those with certain 
injuries and diseases to qualify for them. Florida has cut benefits to 
its most severely disabled workers by 65 percent since 1994. . . . 
Many states have not only shrunk the payments to injured workers; 
they’ve also cut them off after an arbitrary time limit—even if 
workers haven’t recovered. 
Howard Berkes, Injured Workers Suffer as ‘Reforms’ Limit Workers’ Compensation 
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contexts it has been argued that the societal deal originally struck 
in the quid pro quo of workers’ compensation has been 
breached.168  Conceptually, the theory is challenged by attempting 
to establish the point at which reductions in benefits have 
effectively eliminated the workers’ compensation bargain. 
Unlike opt-out, systems that are gradually reducing benefits 
do not face the critique that they have suddenly eliminated 
workers’ compensation rights without any legal guarantee of a 
“reasonably justified substitute.”169  Of course, those complaining 
of incremental erosion may suspect legislative motives of eventual 
elimination of all remedies, but it is usually a conceptual leap to 
convince appellate courts to expand challenges to that extent.  
One significant historical complication of the erosional argument 
is that very early versions of workers’ compensation statutes 
provided benefits that were at times substantially less generous 
than those contained in modern workers’ compensation 
statutes.170  As a practical matter, from the very start of workers’ 
compensation, benefits varied widely by state and according to 
historical economic circumstances.171  This is conceptually 
problematic for challengers because it makes it difficult to 
establish a uniform baseline against which to measure “the grand 
bargain.” 
A case recently litigated in Florida provides an excellent 
example of an incremental reductionist claim.  In Padgett v. State 
of Florida,172 a plaintiff challenged the unfolding of the 2003 
 
Benefits, NPR (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/04390441655/injured-
workers-suffer-as-reforms-limit-workers-compensation-benefits (last visited June 25, 
2016). 
 168.  Amanda Yoder, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bringing Common Law 
Negligence Back into Employment Law, 75 MO. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2010) (“The 
original bargain struck between employer and employee that formed the basis of 
worker compensation statutes [in Missouri] is no longer the same balanced 
exchange.”). 
 169.  Especially with respect to an opt-out structure that both retains the exclusive 
remedy rule and eliminates employees’ rights to a statutory workers’ compensation 
benefit. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001) (finding that 
remedy clause in state constitution mandated that a remedy be available to all persons 
for injuries to “absolute” common-law rights for which a cause of action existed when 
the drafters wrote the constitution, and concluding that, having demonstrated that 
there was no remedial process available under present workers’ compensation laws, 
plaintiff should have been allowed to proceed with negligence action). 
 170.  FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 174-75 (providing 
statistical information showing the wide variation in workers’ compensation benefit 
levels from 1911-1930). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 
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revisions to Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.173  Plaintiff 
challenged the requirement that injured workers in some 
instances be responsible for payment of medical treatment 
necessitated by their work-related injuries,174 an obligation that 
is at odds with core understandings of the nature of workers’ 
compensation.175  Another major challenge raised was to the 2003 
elimination of wage loss benefits for partial incapacity.176 
Padgett commenced when an injured worker sued his 
employer for negligence.177  The employer raised the defense of 
exclusive remedy immunity of the Florida Workers’ 
Compensation Act.178  In response, the plaintiff amended his 
complaint, seeking a declaration that the exclusive remedy 
immunity was both invalid and violated due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the open courts, 
 
13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural grounds). Padgett had a complicated procedural 
history and reviewed Cortes v. Velda Farms, No. 11-13661 CA 25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 
13, 2014), one of a series of consolidated cases. Cortes was dismissed on mootness and 
standing grounds, so the merits were not ultimately discussed by the Florida appellate 
courts. State v. Florida Workers’ Advocates, 167 So.3d 500, 504 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 
2015). Cortes is nevertheless the focus of the ensuing discussion because it so squarely 
raised the essential incremental-erosional challenge. Other similar cases are in the 
pipelines as of this writing. See, e.g., Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 124 So.3d 392, 394 
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2013), and Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So.3d 440 (Fla. 
App. 1 Dist. 2013), review granted by Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 143 So.3d 924 
(Fla. 2013). Throughout the discussion, and for procedural reasons I deliberately omit, 
I will refer to the Cortes trial order as “Padgett.” 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 1-2. 
 175.  Id. at 3. 
 176.  Id.  
In most states, the most expensive category of cases are for 
permanent partial disability. A nine-state study that examined the 
costs of cases as of March 2002 for injuries that occurred in 1998-
999 found that over one-half of cases in which temporary disability 
lasted more than 7 days resulted in permanent partial disability in 
six of the nine states (Telles, Wang, and Tanabe 2004). The median 
cost of such cases in the nine states exceeded $32,000. Blum and 
Burton (2003, Table 7A) have reported that the average amount of 
cash benefits paid per permanent partial disability case nationally 
for accident (injury) year 1999 was over $35,000. Many permanent 
partial disability cases take years to resolve; in some states, a 
significant fraction were not closed more than 3 years after the 
injury date. 
Peter S. Barth, Compensating Workers for Permanent Partial Disabilities, 65 SOC. SEC. 
BULLETIN 16, 18 (2004), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n4/v65n4pl6.html. 
 177.  Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 1. 
 178.  Id. 
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and under provisions of the Florida Constitution.179  The employer 
withdrew its exclusive remedy defense, and the court severed it 
as a party from the declaratory relief portion of the complaint.180  
The employer’s exit from the case called into question the 
existence of a reviewable controversy on standing grounds,181 an 
issue that would essentially result in the case’s dismissal.182  
Reviewability appeared preliminarily to be restored when 
Padgett, a “concrete” workers’ compensation beneficiary allegedly 
harmed by the statute, was allowed to intervene.183 
Understanding the Padgett context requires some work.  In 
1968, Florida revised its Constitution and Declaration of 
Rights.184  At the time of the revision, the Florida Workers’ 
Compensation Act provided full payment for medical treatment 
and weekly indemnity benefits for partially disabled workers.185  
In 1970, the legislature amended the Act to, among other things, 
prevent injured workers from opting out of workers’ compensation 
and suing in tort,186 which, up until that time, had been 
authorized.187  No increased benefits were afforded to workers in 
exchange for relinquishing their right to sue.188  In 1973, Florida 
became a comparative (as opposed to a contributory) negligence 
state.189  As a result, plaintiffs could not be absolutely barred from 
 
 179.  Id. at 2. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  For a discussion of the procedural handling of the case, see Thomas Robinson, 
Florida Appellate Court Throws Out Judge Cueto’s “Padgett” Decision on Procedural 
Grounds, THE WORKCOMP WRITER, available at http://www.workcompwriter.com/how-
one-state-bucked-trend-of-allowing-former-spouse-to-access-post-divorce-workers-
comp-benefits/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
 182.  Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 1. 
 183.  Id. Padgett, in other words, could demonstrate having suffered a concrete and 
particularized harm. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 
(reaffirming that for purposes of standing, “plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in 
fact’—an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is . . . concrete and 
particularized.”). 
 184.  See CONST. OF THE STATE OF FLA. (revised and amended 1968), FLA. SENATE, 
http://flsenate.gov/Laws/Constitution. 
 185.  Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 3. 
 186.  Id. at 7. 
 187.  The employee opt-out right was apparently originally conferred to mirror the 
employer’s corresponding right to opt out of the system, a right that was also 
extinguished as part of the 1970 amendments. Id. at 3-4. One may recall that Texas 
affords both employers and employees the right to opt out of its Act. So, in an 
interesting twist, Florida’s alleged abrogation of the exclusive remedy rule began with 
cessation of opt-out. 
 188.  Id. at 8. 
 189.  Id. at 7. 
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receiving a tort remedy if they “in any appreciable way 
contributed to the proximate cause of the injury.”190  Accordingly, 
stripping workers of the right to sue became a different 
proposition under tort law, because tort plaintiffs had become 
eligible to recover damages on a comparative negligence theory, 
making recovery more likely than it had been in 1970.191  In 2000, 
the Florida legislature suspended injured workers’ entitlement to 
partial incapacity indemnity benefits.192  The Act, as amended in 
2003,193 required—for the first time—that injured workers pay a 
portion of medical treatment costs related to their work-related 
injuries once these workers reached “maximum medical 
improvement.”194 
Given these developments, the trial court in Padgett 
concluded that the quid pro quo of tort for workers’ compensation 
was no longer adequate.195  The court opined that partial 
incapacity attributable to an employer’s negligence in causing a 
work-related injury would have been fully compensable in 
negligence prior to the creation of the workers’ compensation 
remedy, as would medical treatment made necessary by such 
tortious conduct.196  Further, the exclusive remedy rule reduced 
 
 190.  German-American Lumber Co. v. Hannah, 53 So. 516, 517 (Fla. 1910). 
 191.  Contributory negligence automatically shuts off the plaintiff who is also 
negligent in connection with a harm, while comparative negligence allows for the 
possibility of tort recovery even where the plaintiff is also negligent. See Bradley v. 
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 87, 882-83 (W.Va. 1979). 
 192.  Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 8. Under many workers’ compensation 
statutes an injured worker would be entitled to both a scheduled benefit as a statutory 
remuneration for the injury to a listed body part or member, and a partial benefit 
based in some manner on a loss of earning capacity as reflected by the difference 
between the worker’s pre-injury wage and post-injury earning capacity. See OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015) (discussing partial benefit designs). Professor John 
Burton, the leading American academic commentator on workers’ compensation law, 
testified by deposition in Padgett. According to Professor Burton, as of the date of his 
testimony there was no other state in the country that had completely eliminated 
workers’ compensation wage loss benefits for employees who had suffered a partial (as 
opposed to a total) loss of work-related earning capacity. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 
at 4. 
 193.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.13(14)(c) (West 2012). 
 194.  “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, following overall 
maximum medical improvements from an injury compensable under this chapter, the 
employee is obligated to pay a copayment of $10 per visit for medical services. The 
copayment shall not apply to emergency care provided to the employee.” Id. For a 
definition of “Maximum Medical Improvement,” see infra note 214, § 560. 
 195.  Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 19-20. 
 196.  Id. at 3, 8. Of course, this assumes that the work-related injury was not an 
accident. What workers undeniably get from workers’ compensation is compensation 
for accidents—a remedy that would not be available in a fault-based regime like 
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aggregate liability for employers,197 but because of the reduction 
in workers’ compensation benefits there was no longer a truly 
correlative benefit for workers.198  Thus, the nature of the quid 
pro quo changed.199  The court appeared to have accepted the 
argument that workers were forced to give up more to participate 
in the workers’ compensation system than had been the case prior 
to 1970 as a result of losing the right to sue.200 
The unified narrative from Padgett provides that, at the time 
of the creation of the Florida exclusive remedy rule in 1935,201 
workers were arguably satisfied with the quid pro quo because of 
the toll that the affirmative defense of contributory negligence 
took on common law negligence suits.202  However, Florida’s 
replacement of contributory negligence with comparative 
negligence203 meant that, if negligence could be established, 
workers were much more likely to enjoy some recovery in tort.  To 
the extent recovery would exceed the typical workers’ 
compensation remedy of two-thirds of the average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury,204 workers would prefer the negligence 
recovery.  Furthermore, a worker partially incapacitated or 
disabled and suffering only a partial wage loss as a result of her 
employer’s negligence might be entitled to complete recovery of 
that wage loss in tort,205 but not in workers’ compensation.206  
Similarly, an injured worker might be able to achieve in tort 
complete recovery for medical expenses related to a work 
injury,207 while under the present workers’ compensation system 
in Florida there is a chance for less-than-full recovery for medical 
treatment required by a work-related injury.208  The legal baseline 
inherent in the quid pro quo has changed.  The rhetorical question 
posed is whether a hypothetical worker in the “original position” 
during the inception of workers’ compensation would agree to this 
 
negligence. 
 197.  Id. at 4. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. at 16, 18. 
 200.  See id. at 18 (explaining that after losing option of tort litigation, employees 
no longer have right to sue for injuries). 
 201.  Id. at 6. 
 202.  Id. at 12. 
 203.  Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 436-37 (Fla. 1973). 
 204.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(1)(a), (2)(a), (4)(a) (West 2012). 
 205.  Padgett, at 16. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 4. 
 208.  Id. at 4, 8. 
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version of the grand bargain.209  The argument might continue 
that the absence of worker premiums for changes in tort law 
amounted to a windfall for employers.210  Under these 
circumstances, maintaining the exclusive remedy rule is no longer 
supportable.211 
Florida courts faced similar arguments in recent years, but 
in slightly different contexts.  For example, in Westphal v. City of 
St. Petersburg,212 a Florida appellate court was faced with an 
interpretation of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act that 
effectively left certain classification of totally incapacitated 
workers without any remedy for workplace injury.213  In Westphal, 
workers with temporary total disability for the maximum 
statutory period for entitlement to benefits had not yet been found 
to have reached maximum medical improvement214—a condition 
precedent for transitioning from temporary to permanent 
benefits.215  Thus, their entitlement to workers’ compensation 
benefits simply expired, even though they continued to be totally 
disabled as a factual matter.216  Accordingly, an uncompensated 
“gap” was created between the time of the temporary total 
disability expiration and the point at which they were eventually 
able to reestablish entitlement to total permanent benefits.217  
While the court did not explicitly discuss quid pro quo, it did 
observe that: 
[A]n interpretation that would create a potential gap 
in disability benefits could result in an uncorrectable 
error.  If the claim is denied because the disabled 
worker may still improve and it turns out later that he 
or she does not improve, the logical inference would be 
that the worker had, in fact, reached maximum 
medical improvement earlier.  Yet there is nothing in 
the law that would enable the worker to recover the 
disability benefits he or she should have been 
 
 209.  Id. at 7. 
 210.  Id. at 3-4. 
 211.  Id. at 19-20. 
 212.  122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 213.  Id. at 444. 
 214.  Maximum medical improvement “is the point at which the employee’s injury 
will not materially improve with additional rest or treatment.” 100 C.J.S. Workers’ 
Compensation § 650 (2013). 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d 440, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 217.  Id. at 446. 
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receiving in the meantime.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that, if the Legislature had intended to create 
a gap in the payment of disability benefits, it would 
have at least provided a remedy for the recovery of lost 
benefits if it could be shown later that the claimant 
was actually at maximum medical improvement all 
along and should have been receiving those 
benefits. . . . [W]e have never before been confronted 
with a constitutional challenge to the statutes in 
question.  Such a question was not presented . . . in 
any other previous case presented to the court.  It is 
safe to say that the prospect of declaring the statute 
unconstitutional put the issue in an entirely new 
light.218 
The strong implication was that workers left with no recovery 
might have a basis for a constitutional challenge premised on the 
lack of any remedy for injury.219  In Padgett, the trial court relied 
heavily on the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Martinez v. 
Scanlan.220  There, the court rejected a quid pro quo argument 
raised by Scanlan, who had challenged the 1990 workers’ 
compensation statutory amendments on a variety of theories.221  
With respect to a challenge premised on breach of quid pro quo, 
the court said: 
Although chapter 90-201 undoubtedly reduces 
benefits to eligible workers, the workers’ 
compensation law remains a reasonable alternative to 
tort litigation.  It continues to provide injured workers 
with full medical care and wage-loss payments for 
total or partial disability regardless of fault and 
without the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation.  
Furthermore, while there are situations where an 
 
 218.  Id. at 447-48. 
 219.  Westphal was recently reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court, which held 
that: 
[Section 440.15(2)(a)] of the workers’ compensation statute is 
unconstitutional under article I, section 21, of the Florida 
Constitution, as a denial of the right of access to courts, because it 
deprives an injured worker of disability benefits under these 
circumstances for an indefinite amount of time—thereby creating a 
system of redress that no longer functions as a reasonable 
alternative to tort litigation. 
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, No. SC13-1930 (Fla. June 9, 2016). 
 220.  582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991). 
 221.  Martinez v. Scanlon, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1170-73 (Fla. 1991). 
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employee would be eligible for benefits under the pre-
1990 workers’ compensation law and now, as a result 
of chapter 90-201, is no longer eligible, that employee 
is not without a remedy.  There still may remain the 
viable alternative of tort litigation in these instances.  
As to this attack, the statute passes constitutional 
muster.222 
With respect to the language in Martinez (contentions that 
the trial judge accepted), the plaintiff and Padgett argued that 
recent developments had undercut Martinez’s rationale as to 
workers’ compensation as a reasonable alternative to tort 
litigation.223  After 2003, workers’ compensation in Florida no 
longer provided injured workers with full medical care in some 
cases, or with any wage loss compensation for partial disability.224  
The plaintiff next argued that, in light of the benefit reductions, 
injured workers are now authorized to proceed in tort.225  The 
important conceptual point made in Padgett, a point that was 
established implicitly by Martinez, is that the level and duration 
of benefits could be subject to scrutiny for adequacy to ensure the 
statute continued to pass constitutional muster under the Florida 
Constitution.226  Martinez essentially opened the door for Padgett 
and for future cases premised on continued benefit adequacy. 
The Florida incremental erosion cases are driven by the 
unique history and structure of the Florida Constitution.  A 
number of states possess constitutions containing language 
requiring “open courts,”227 and Florida is no exception.  Article I, 
Section 21 of the Florida Constitution states that “[t]he courts 
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice 
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”228  This 
language may suggest that there must be at least some 
substantive remedy for injury, and cases such as Westphal, 
raising scenarios in which workers might be left with no 
remedy,229 become problematic under such an interpretation.  
However, not every state with an open courts provision has read 
 
 222.  Id. at 1171-72. 
 223.  Padgett at 16. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. at 4. 
 226.  Padgett at 16. 
 227.  See infra Part IV. 
 228.  FLA. STAT. ANN., CONST., art. 1, § 21 (West 1970). 
 229.  Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d at 448. 
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a substantive right to a remedy into the provision.230 
A second potent, anti-erosional feature of Florida law was 
showcased in Kluger v. White.231  There, the Florida Supreme 
Court considered a law providing that tort actions in connection 
with automobile accidents were completely abolished where a 
putative plaintiff carried automobile insurance or where a 
plaintiff without insurance suffered damages of less than $550.232  
In Kluger, because the fair market value of the plaintiff’s damaged 
automobile was $250, she could receive no more than that amount 
under Florida law.233  Because she also carried no insurance, the 
plaintiff was effectively without a remedy for damages.234  The 
court held that this abolishment of the remedy violated the 
Florida open courts provision.235  In support of its conclusion, the 
court first noted that it “ha[d] never before specifically spoken to 
the issue of whether or not the constitutional guarantee of a 
‘redress of any injury’ . . . bars the statutory abolition of an 
existing remedy without providing an alternative protection to 
the injured party.”236  Noting that Florida’s Declaration of Human 
Rights had previously been found binding on the legislature,237 
the court recited the following language from the Corpus Juris 
Secundum: 
A constitutional provision insuring a certain remedy 
for all injuries or wrongs does not command 
continuation of a specific statutory remedy.  However, 
in a jurisdiction wherein the constitutional guaranty 
applies to the legislature as well as to the judiciary . . . 
it has been held that the guaranty precludes the repeal 
of a statute allowing a remedy where the statute was 
in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.  
Furthermore . . . the guaranty also prevents, in some 
jurisdictions, the total abolition of a common-law 
remedy.238 
Because the right to a tort recovery for the type of automobile 
accident suffered by the plaintiff existed prior to the adoption of 
 
 230.  See infra Part IV. A. 
 231.  281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). 
 232.  Id. at 2. 
 233.  Id. at 2-3. 
 234.  Id. at 3. 
 235.  For text of the provision, see FLA. STAT. ANN., CONST., art. 1, § 21 (West 1970).  
 236.  Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 3 (internal citation omitted). 
 237.  Id.at 4. 
 238.  Id. at 3-4 (citing 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 710, 1218-19 (1956)). 
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the 1968 iteration of the Florida Constitution,239 the court deemed 
it “essential . . . that this Court consider whether or not the 
Legislature is, in fact, empowered to abolish a common law and 
statutory right of action without providing an adequate 
alternative.”240  The court then went on to announce principles 
that are germane to the workers’ compensation discussion: 
Upon careful consideration of the requirements of 
society, and the ever-evolving character of the law, we 
cannot adopt a complete prohibition against such 
legislative change.  Nor can we adopt a view which 
would allow the Legislature to destroy a traditional 
and long-standing cause of action upon mere 
legislative whim, or when an alternative approach is 
available. . . . We hold, therefore, that  where a right 
of access to the courts for redress for a particular 
injury has been provided by statutory law predating 
the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such 
right has become a part of the common law of the 
State . . . the Legislature is without power to abolish 
such a right without providing a reasonable 
alternative to protect the rights of the people of the 
State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature 
can show an overpowering public necessity for the 
abolishment of such right, and no alternative method 
of meeting such public necessity can be shown.241 
Thus, as the argument goes in Padgett, because the workers’ 
compensation quid pro quo pre-dated the 1968 constitution, the 
court must “not allow the Legislature to destroy a traditional and 
long-standing cause of action upon mere legislative whim, or 
when an alternative approach is available.”242  Further, workers’ 
compensation may not be abolished “unless the Legislature can 
show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of 
such right, and no alternative method for meeting such public 
necessity can be shown.”243  The rejoinder to the argument is that 
an amendment to the workers’ compensation statute is not an 
abolishment.  However, this begs the question of how far a statute 
can be amended before it ceases to retain its essential character. 
 
 239.  Id. at 4. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id.  
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
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The peculiar character of Florida’s constitution, therefore, 
makes it uniquely possible to argue that workers’ compensation 
benefits—as a substitute for a longstanding tort remedy—may 
not be abolished without providing a reasonable alternative 
absent an “overpowering public necessity.”244  Other state courts 
may of course be less inclined to place their thumbs on the scale 
of “reasonable” alternatives when interpreting legislative 
modifications of workers’ compensation statutes.245 
D.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON STATE-SPECIFIC 
CONTEXTS 
Whether authorizing opt-out, as in Texas and Oklahoma,246 
or enacting incremental-erosional changes in medical and 
permanent partial incapacity benefits, as in Florida,247 states can 
anticipate pushback by plaintiffs to workers’ compensation 
benefit reduction.  Because of the multijurisdictional character of 
workers’ compensation law, both statutory modification and 
opposition to change can take on a peculiarly local character, as 
they have in the three states discussed in this Part.  Nevertheless, 
workers’ compensation law, despite being formally multi-state in 
character, was originally instituted as a sweeping national 
phenomenon. 
Between 1910 and 1920, forty-three states enacted workers’ 
compensation statutes,248 a rate of implementation that would be 
the envy of many federal statutes.249  With current total national 
workers’ compensation expenditures at just under 60 billion 
dollars per year,250 plaintiffs and defendants in various statutes 
possess large incentives both to oppose and to support 
modifications to workers’ compensation law, and, in accordance 
with history, to move quickly.  The remainder of this article 
sketches the probable contours of legal argument surrounding 
proposed changes to traditional workers’ compensation statutes, 
premised on both state and federal constitutional law.  These 
arguments—which apply equally in other tort reform contexts—
will likely test the limits of legislative hegemony in the realm of 
 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  See infra Part IV. 
 246.  See supra Part III. A., B. 
 247.  See supra Part III. C. 
 248.  FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 103-04. 
 249.  Id. at 93-94, 100-01. 
 250.  See 2016 Liberty Mutual Workplace Safety Index, supra note 79. 
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personal injury rights and remedies, and plaintiffs will seek to 
develop a framework of “rights” which may not be dispossessed 
lightly.251  Part IV, infra, discusses state constitutional theories 
germane to the restraint of state legislatures seeking to reform 
personal injury law. 
IV. STATE RESTRAINT: OPEN COURTS, RIGHT TO A 
REMEDY, QUID PRO QUO 
Challenges to significant changes in workers’ compensation 
law are akin to even broader challenges to tort reform seeking to 
reduce plaintiff remedies.  Because workers’ compensation was 
the personal injury substitute for tort,252 significant incursions on 
workers’ compensation should be seen in the same way as 
interference with tort.  Assuming a court were to accept this 
premise, the next question centers on the importance of the tort 
right, or, of a right to remedy for personal injury generally. 
The underlying question is whether a right to a remedy for 
personal injury—whether in tort or workers’ compensation—is of 
more than ordinary importance and whether that right’s 
diminution by a legislature is sufficient to generate heightened 
judicial scrutiny.  Arguments that a right to a remedy for personal 
injury should be treated as possessing such importance has 
received vague support at the federal level.253  At the state level, 
however, plaintiffs have occasionally made headway by arguing 
that significant reduction or elimination of injury damages should 
be evaluated by the judiciary with heightened scrutiny because 
the rights in question are at least important under a state’s 
constitution.254  One variation of the argument is that benefit 
 
 251.  Goldberg, supra note 33, at 626 (“The law of redress is basic to our conception 
of liberal-constitutional government, and was built into the fabric of our legal 
system.”). 
 252.  FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 4. 
 253.  Compare New York C.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917) (“[T]he whole 
common-law doctrine of employer’s liability for negligence . . . is based upon fictions, 
and is inapplicable to modern conditions of employment.”), with Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978) (rejecting tort-based challenge 
to preemption under the Price-Anderson Act, repeating maxim that no one has a 
vested right in a rule of common law), and Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Ohio 
1991) (“[T]he statute must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts under 
which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate legislative objective.”). See 
also infra Part IV. C. (further discussing the holding in Morris), and infra Part V. A. 
(discussing that Duke Power endorsed heightened judicial scrutiny of tort 
modifications, while denying it was doing so). 
 254.  See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 840 (N.H. 1980) (citing Briscoe Co. v. 
Rutgers, 327 A.2d 687, 690 (N.J. 1974), and Hunter v. North Mason Sch. Dist., 539 
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reductions result in inadequate or unreasonably low 
compensation,255 effecting a breach in the original “grand 
bargain” or quid pro quo in which workers surrendered their tort 
rights for reasonable alternative compensation.256  Another 
variation of state constitutional argument centers on “right to a 
remedy” provisions.257  As will be discussed in more detail 
below,258 quid pro quo and “right to a remedy” theories are closely 
related.  Implicit in the concept of quid pro quo is the idea that it 
would be impermissible to extinguish one right of the involved 
kind without replacing it with another similar right because the 
original right was important.259 
Of course, plaintiffs have challenged limitations on tort 
remedies on several other state constitutional theories, including 
the denial of the right to a jury trial,260 and under provisions that 
prohibit special legislation261 and require separation of 
governmental powers.262  This Article addresses each of these 
theories, but will focus on challenges centered on right to a 
remedy and open courts, the quid pro quo category of due process, 
and state constitutional equal protection. 
A.  RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND OPEN COURTS 
“Right to a remedy” language is often located in the “open 
courts” provision of state constitutions263 and has sometimes been 
interpreted as ensuring a substantive remedy to litigants, rather 
than merely guaranteeing that courthouse doors will remain open 
to citizens.264  Right to a remedy and open court provisions have 
 
P.2d 845, 848 (Wash. 1975)); see also infra Part IV. C. 
 255.  FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 64. 
 256.  Padgett at 19-20. It is a question for another day whether workers in any 
meaningful sense ever bargained; early twentieth century unions were involved in the 
discussion, but I am not convinced that sufficiently large blocks of workers negotiated 
for the eventful bargain. FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 64-67. 
 257.  Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1309, 1310 (2003) (speech delivered by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas 
“on February 28, 2002 for the annual Justice William J. Brennan Lecture on State 
Courts and Social Justice at New York School of Law.”). 
 258.  See infra Part IV. A. 
 259.  Phillips, supra note 257, at 1335. 
 260.  Goldberg, supra note 33, at 527 n.5. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Phillips, supra note 257, at 1311. 
 264.  Id. at 1310. 
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ancient roots in the Magna Carta.265  The current right to a 
remedy and open courts provision in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, for example, is a remnant of the ancient language: 
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury 
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation 
shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and 
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.266 
The ancient language itself read: 
[E]very subject of this realme, for injury done to 
him . . . by any other subject . . . without exception, 
may take his remedy by the course of the law, and 
have justice, and right for the injury done to him, 
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay.267 
Some state courts have concluded, primarily in the context of 
litigation over tort or medical malpractice reform,268 that the right 
to remedy and open courts language in their constitutions means 
that citizens should have a right to an adequate substantive 
remedy.269  Some open courts provisions explicitly include the 
phrase “right to a remedy,”270 but there are also variations to this 
language.271  As already noted,272 Florida’s courts have decided 
that Florida’s open courts provision establishes a doctrine of quid 
pro quo, a requirement that “vested” rights may not be modified 
 
 265.  Id. Or perhaps in one of its “restatements” by Sir Edward Coke in the 
Institutes. Id. at 1311. 
 266.  ART. 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11 (West 2011). 
 267.  Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary ‘Right to a Remedy,’ 34 TRIAL 48, 49 (Mar. 
1998) (quoting Edward Coke, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
England A6, 55-56 (E&R Brooke ed. 1797)). 
 268.  Phillips, supra note 261, at 1332-34. 
 269.  See, e.g., Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 365 (Utah 1989) 
(concluding that arbitrary limit on tort damages awarded by juries impinged on both 
the right to a remedy and right to a jury trial because it was the historic province of 
the jury to award damages). 
 270.  Phillips, supra note 257, at 1310. 
 271.  
[There are] 27 state constitutions that require courts to be open, 36 
that require justice to be administered promptly, 27 that require 
justice to be administered without purchase or sale, 34 that require 
justice to be granted completely and/or without denial, and 11 that 
require justice to be delivered freely. Additionally, 35 sates provide 
a right to a remedy, of which 21 require the remedy to be by due 
process or due course of law. 
Id. at n.5 (citing 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES app. 6 at 6-65 to 6-67 (3d ed. 2000)). 
 272.  See supra Part III. C. 
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unless a reasonable remedy is substituted for them.273  Because 
some states afford citizens the practical equivalent of vested 
rights to remedies, some notable commentators have opined that 
individual rights are, at times, better protected by state 
constitutions than by their federal counterpart.274 
“Right to a remedy” and open courts arguments were 
featured prominently in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.275  In 
the case, a truck shop lube technician alleged that his employer 
“negligently allowed acid laden mist and fumes to drift into the 
shop area where [he] worked, causing harm to his respiratory 
system, skin, teeth, and joints.”276  The technician filed a workers’ 
compensation claim, which was denied by his employer’s 
insurance carrier.277  Ultimately the Workers’ Compensation 
Board of the State of Oregon upheld the denial,278 finding that the 
technician’s work was not the “major contributing cause of his 
injuries”279 and that he did not have “compensable injury” under 
the workers’ compensation statute.280  Additionally, the 
technician could not bring a tort suit because of the exclusive 
remedy rule, and the trial court dismissed his complaint when he 
tried to do so.281  Thus, the technician in Smothers was in the same 
position as the Florida plaintiffs in Westphal and Kluger.  Each of 
these plaintiffs was completely cut off from any remedy for 
personal injury,282 in a sense of conceptually easier scenario than 
one in which the “adequacy” of a remedy is under dispute.283 
 
 273.  Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973). 
 274.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). 
 275.  23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001). The case was overturned as this Article went to press 
in Horton v. Oregon Health and Science University, —P.3d—, 359 Or. 168 (Or. 2016). 
However, the author is of the opinion that the case will continue to be influential in 
the back-and-forth arguments surrounding the limits of legislative supremacy over 
tort reform. The case will undoubtedly continue to be an example in Oregon and 
elsewhere, so its close analysis in this article will be retained. 
 276.  The appellate court chronicled the facts in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, 
Inc., 941 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Or. App. 1997). 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Smothers, 941 P.2d at 1066; Westphal, 122 So.3d at 443; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 
5. 
 283.  Similarly, Oklahoma employees of opt-out employers may credibly argue that 
they have been dispossessed of a legal remedy for injury because there is no legal 
requirement under Oklahoma law that alternative benefit plans pay any specific 
amount or level of benefits. 
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On appeal, the technician in Smothers argued that the court’s 
application of the Oregon exclusive remedy rule violated, among 
other things, the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution.284  
The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the argument, stating: 
The question in this case is whether the legislature, 
when it amended [the exclusive remedy rule], 
intended to declare that a work-related harm that is 
outside the definition of “compensable injury” in [the 
workers’ compensation statute] is not a “legally 
cognizable” injury.  If that was its intention, then 
there is no “right” on which a “deprivation of a remedy” 
argument could be predicated.285 
The appellate court’s response went directly to the heart of 
the matter: the only “rights” in question were statutory workers’ 
compensation and tort rights,286 and, if the legislature wanted to 
extinguish either or both sets of rights, it had plenary power to do 
so.287  While it could not, of course, create a right and then deny a 
remedy,288 this was not the situation.  While there may be no right 
without a remedy, there is also no remedy without a right.289 
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s 
decision in Smothers290 in the only way logically possible.  The 
court found the existence of a substantive right in the remedies 
clause of the state constitution291 and drew on a great deal of 
history in doing so.292  The argument has been that Magna Carta 
and the history of open courts and remedies provisions293 did not 
appear out of thin air.  As Thomas Phillips wrote, one of the most 
widespread and important of state constitutional provisions is the 
“right of access to the courts to obtain a remedy for injury.”294  The 
 
 284.  The Oregon Constitution states: “No court shall be secret, but justice shall be 
administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every 
man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, 
property, or reputation.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. CONST. Art. I, § 10 (West 2014). 
 285.  Smothers, 941 P.2d at 1068. 
 286.  Id. at 1067. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. at 1068. 
 289.  Professor Bauman refers to this as a “circular maxim.” John H. Bauman, 
Remedies in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 237, 281 (1991). 
 290.  Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 363 (Or. 2001). 
 291.  Id.at 339. 
 292.  Id. at 340. 
 293.  Id. at 341. 
 294.  Phillips, supra note 257, at 1310. 
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right to a remedy for injury derives from Magna Carta,295 and the 
seventeenth century articulation of it from Lord Coke may be 
found in the constitutions of eleven states.296 
The Oregon Supreme Court, as well as numerous scholars, 
have traced a taxonomy of rights—that would have been familiar 
to the founders, adopters of the early remedy provisions297—to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries,298 in which the rights of persons at 
common law were divided into “absolute” and “relative” rights.299  
Among the absolute rights were those of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property.300  Absolute rights, 
according to Blackstone, could not be protected simply by 
declaring them; they had to be subject to vindication.301  The 
“right to a remedy” was one of five subordinate rights allowing 
vindication of absolute rights.302  Once a person suffered injury to 
one of those rights, an “adequate remedy” automatically 
attached.303 
The Blackstone formulation was not conceived as a “due 
process” protection because the threat of encroachment on rights 
arose from the Crown and from private actors, not from the 
legislature.304  Nevertheless, the right to a remedy existed within 
Blackstone’s “natural law” rights taxonomy.305  Phillips has 
argued persuasively that early-American tort cases were 
consistent with Blackstone’s absolute-relative right model: 
In most early American cases, the courts were willing 
to supply a remedy for every right, whether created by 
common law or statute.  But they were not bound to 
 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  “That every person for every injury done him in his goods, land or person, 
ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the land and ought to have justice 
and right for the injury done to him freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.” Id. at 1311. 
 297.  Smothers, 23 P.3d at 350. 
 298.  Id. at 342. 
 299.  Phillips, supra note 257, at 1321 n.42.  
 300.  Id. 
 301.  SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNIGHT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 63 (2d ed. 1884). 
 302.  Phillips, supra note 257, at 1321. 
 303.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 301, at 68. 
 304.  But see Lord Coke’s controversial Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 
652; 8 Co. Rep. 113 b, 118 a (ruling that “[I]n many cases, the common law will control 
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act 
of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.”). 
 305.  Phillips, supra note 257, at 1331. 
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
2016] STATE’S AUTHORITY TO OPT-OUT 167 
preserve any particular remedy or procedure for 
vindicating the right.  As long as the new law 
preserved the injured person’s ability to vindicate his 
or her rights in court or provided an adequate 
substitute remedy, the right to a remedy was not 
violated.  The courts also allowed legislatures to limit 
remedies derived from relative law, such as 
respondeat superior, in part because the injured 
person retained the right to obtain a judicial remedy 
against the individual who caused the injury, that is, 
the individual who violated the injured person’s 
absolute right to personal security.306 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Smothers followed a similar 
line of reasoning.307  It was the business of the court to trace the 
“right to a remedy” clause from its apparent origins in Magna 
Carta, through Lord Coke, William Blackstone, the early 
colonists, the Founders, and ultimately, back to the Oregon 
Constitution.308  It is a long story,309 at the culmination of which 
the court concluded: 
As we have explained, the history of the remedy clause 
indicates that its purpose is to protect absolute 
common-law rights respecting person, property, and 
reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon 
Constitution was drafted in 1857.  The means for 
protecting those rights is the mandate that remedy by 
due course of law be available in the event of injury.310 
From that resolution, it was a short step for the court to 
conclude that Smothers had been deprived of his remedy.311  
Then, the court conceptually went one step further: not only was 
it impermissible to deprive a citizen of a remedy, it was equally 
impermissible to deprive him of a plainly inadequate remedy.312  
The court acknowledged the right of the legislature to alter law, 
but imposed a limitation: 
Although this court has held that the remedy clause 
preserves common-law rights of action, it never has 
 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 350 (Or. 2001). 
 308.  Id. at 340-46. 
 309.  And one that is beyond the scope of my present inquiry. For a concise and 
penetrating account, see generally Goldberg, supra note 33, at 560-68. 
 310.  Smothers, 23 P.3d at 353. 
 311.  Id.at 362. 
 312.  Id. 
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
168    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
held that the remedy clause prohibits the legislature 
from changing a common-law remedy or form of 
procedure, attaching conditions precedent to invoking 
the remedy, or perhaps even abolishing old remedies 
and substituting new remedies.  That is, the court 
never has held that the remedy clause freezes in place 
common-law remedies.  However, just as the 
legislature cannot deny a remedy entirely for injury to 
constitutionally protected common-law rights, neither 
can it substitute an “emasculated remedy” that is 
incapable of restoring the right that has been 
injured.313 
This line of thought reveals a conceptual linchpin between 
right to a remedy and quid pro quo.  The remedy may be altered—
adjusted for historical circumstances—but the right may not be 
annihilated, for it is absolute.314  Many courts have refined or 
disagreed with this line of reasoning.  As Jennifer Friesen has 
explained: 
At least three theoretical positions can be discerned 
from the various “tests” announced: the historically 
tied approach, the “reasonable alternative” public 
policy approach, and the legislative power approach.  
The historically tied approach holds that the [open 
courts and remedies] clauses protect only common law 
causes of action that existed at the time of the 
adoption of the constitutional clause, which are 
preserved unless the legislature substitutes another 
adequate remedy or “quid pro quo” for the affected 
litigants.  The public policy approach permits the 
legislature to limit any cause of action and remedy if 
it creates a reasonable alternative, but, even without 
creating a substitute, it may alter former rights if it 
acts for a very important reason or is responding to an 
overwhelming public need.  The third theory allows 
legislatures the broadest power to alter common law 
rights and remedies by redefining the notion of legal 
injury.315 
 
 313.  Id. at 354 (internal citations omitted). 
 314.  Id. at 362. 
 315.  FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9. For examples of the historically tied 
approach, see Bryant v. Cont’l Conveyor & Equip. Co., 751 P.2d 509, 511 (Ariz. 1988), 
and Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 77 N.W. 174, 175 (Wis. 1898). For examples 
of the public policy approach, see Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 634, 
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Utilization of this rubric reveals opinions form Florida and 
Oregon already discussed as undertaking primarily “historically-
tied approaches.”316  Challenges to opt-out and significant 
incremental-erosional modifications to workers’ compensation 
statutes would likely have the greatest success in those 
jurisdictions in which courts have been sympathetic to such 
historical arguments within tort reform contexts.  Smothers, for 
example, utilized a historically-tied approach to both presume 
that the essence of a common law right to a remedy must be 
preserved and to insist that any substitute remedy be adequate.317 
The “public policy” approach may also be useful to opponents 
of opt-out and incremental-erosional workers’ compensation 
modifications, because it requires that remedial substitutes for 
rights be “reasonable.”318  However, this approach leaves open the 
possibility that substitution may lawfully be “unreasonable” when 
the legislature is acting for an important reason or responding to 
an overwhelming public need.319  The question in these situations 
may be whether the burden is on the government to demonstrate 
the existence or severity of the public need.  Finally, if a 
jurisdiction’s courts utilize the “legislative power” approach, it 
does not appear that adequacy or reasonableness will enter into 
those courts’ analyses.320 
Nevertheless, in all but legislative power jurisdictions, it 
would seem likely that opt-out challengers prefer development of 
a historically-tied narrative.  As Professor John Bauman argued, 
states in which this approach is undertaken are, in reality: 
[S]ubjecting the statute to a form of substantive due 
process review.  In substantive due process review, the 
court scrutinizes both the goal of the legislation, to 
determine whether the statute deals with a matter of 
legitimate (or even compelling) government interest, 
and then tests whether the means chosen are properly 
related to achieving that goal.321 
It is likely true, as Professor Bauman has also observed, that 
 
645 (W. Va. 1991), and Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877, 
884-85 (W. Va. 1991). For an example of the legislative power approach, see Meech v. 
Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 493 (Mont. 1989). 
 316.   See Smothers, 23 P.3 at 338, and Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. 
 317.  Smothers, 23 P.3d at 362. 
 318.  Id. at 360. 
 319.  FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9. 
 320.  FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9. 
 321.  Bauman, supra note 289, at 262. 
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“[t]he common law is not divine revelation, but rather a human 
artifact consciously chosen”322 and that “it is hard to decide 
exactly what ‘common law’ is made fundamental by the [remedy] 
provision.”323  However, courts using historically-tied approaches 
to remedies provisions appear to be employing a kind of 
originalism in discerning state-based absolute rights in the 
Blackstonian tradition.  They are in a historical “construction 
zone” and arrive at such a point because “[c]onstruction becomes 
the focus of explicit attention when the meaning of the 
constitutional text is unclear, or the implications of that meaning 
are contested.”324  Within that construction zone, the historical 
peculiarities of states are of significance and have predictably 
been creatively exploited.  One imagines this venture will 
continue, particularly as scholarship matures on the origins of the 
“right to a remedy” and open courts provisions. 
Theories of legislative supremacy, on the other hand, 
challenge historically-tied attempts to ward off tort reform.325  
These theories hold that the authority of the legislature should 
govern absolutely in all areas not explicitly closed off by 
constitutional guarantee.326  In a legislative supremacy 
environment, no personal injury litigant will get anywhere unless 
persuading a court of explicit guarantees of remedies for personal 
injury,327 which will not exist.  In Meech v. Hillhaven West,328 for 
example, the plaintiff sought damages for wrongful termination, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, for 
allegedly oppressive, malicious, unjustifiable conduct by his 
employer, and ultimately for wrongful discharge.329  Montana had 
enacted the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act,330 which, 
by its terms, “preempted” common law remedies.331  The plaintiff 
in Meech challenged the statutory preemption of his tort claims 
on several grounds, including those under Montana’s unified 
 
 322.  Id. at 283. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 22 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 469 (2013). 
 325.  FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9 and accompanying text. 
 326.  FRIESEN, supra note 271, § 6-2(c), 6-9. 
 327.  FRIESEN, supra note 271, § 6-2(c), 6-8. 
 328.  776 P.2d 488, 488 (Mont. 1989). 
 329.   Id. at 490. 
 330.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (2015). 
 331.  Meech, 776 P.2d at 490. 
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constitutional “right to a remedy” and “open courts” provision.332  
The Montana Supreme Court rejected the argument out of hand: 
The legislature’s exercise of its power to alter the 
common law supports in a large part our legal 
system. . . . [M]uch of the legislation altering the 
common law concerns the legislature’s decisions on the 
remedies, redress, or damages obtainable in carious 
causes of action. . . . Legislative decisions to expand 
liability to further various policy objectives are 
debated and passed almost routinely . . . for a variety 
of policy reasons, refuses to provide a cause of action, 
remedy and redress for every injury.  This proposition 
is expressed in Latin as damnum absque injuria, 
meaning a “loss which does not give rise to an action 
for damages against the person causing it.”  The 
legislation at issue here similarly alters common-law 
rights and duties and arguably denies a cause of 
action, remedy, and redress for injuries recognized at 
common law.  If Article II, § 16, guarantees a 
fundamental right to full legal redress as embodied in 
common-law causes of action, then a myriad of 
legislation altering common law in a restrictive 
manner, as well as the Act, denies this fundamental 
right.333 
This is a robust statement of legislative supremacy.  
Essentially, the court held that, assuming the underlying 
substantive tort right is, or might at one time have been, 
considered “fundamental,” the legislature nevertheless had 
plenary authority to abolish it.334  Under this view, no right is 
absolute. 
Of course, courts need not—and at times have not—conceded 
that open courts or remedies provisions have any substantive 
component at all.  It is worth noting that Oklahoma itself does not 
view the remedies clause as providing substance, so opt-out 
challengers there may find little solace in proceeding on such a 
theory.  In Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co.,335 the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, in connection with the state constitutional remedy 
provision, stated: 
 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Id. at 495-96 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 345 
(4th ed. 1979)). 
 334.  Id. at 493-94. 
 335.  162 P. 938 (Okla. 1917). 
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That this was a mandate to the judiciary and was not 
intended as a limitation upon the legislative branch of 
the government seems clear.  Neither do we think it 
was intended to preserve a particular remedy for given 
causes of action in any certain court of the state, nor 
was it intended to deprive the Legislature of the power 
to abolish remedies for future accruing causes of action 
(where not otherwise specifically prohibited), or to 
create new remedies for other wrongs as in its wisdom 
it might determine.336 
A number of states see matters in much the same way.337  
And, whether the remedies provision may be used to imply a 
substantive personal injury right of redress requires a state-by-
state assessment. 
 B.  STATE QUID PRO QUO 
Quid pro quo is essentially a due process concept.338  
Therefore, this article will address the theory in that manner, 
reserving traditional due process analysis for the next Part on 
federal theories of restraint.339  In the federal context, it may be 
worth noting that the Supreme Court implicitly created quid pro 
quo as a matter of federal due process in White and failed to reject 
the theory in the case of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group.340 
Some states have adopted and developed the quid pro quo 
theory341—that remedy for loss of an “important” common law 
right may not be dissolved by a legislature without provision of an 
adequate substitute,342 which may take on different forms.  In 
Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell,343 for example, the 
plaintiffs challenged medical malpractice caps and a requirement 
that they take future damages over time in the form of an 
 
 336.  Id.at 942. 
 337.  FRIESEN, supra note 271, § 6-2(c), 6-6. 
 338.  Jeffrey P. DeGraffenreid, Testing the Constitutionality of Tort Reform with a 
Quid Pro Quo Analysis: Is Kansas’ Judicial Approach an Adequate Substitute for a 
More Traditional Constitutional Requirement?, 31 WASHBURN L. J. 314, 316 (1992). 
 339.  See infra Part V. 
 340.  438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
 341.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  757 P.2d 251, 253 (Kan. 1988), disapproved but not reversed, Bair v. Peck, 811 
P.2d 1176, 1991 (1991). 
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annuity.344  Setting its mood point in prefatory language, the court 
said: 
The Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution are 
there to protect every citizen, including a person who 
has no clout, and the little guy on the block.  They are 
there to protect the rights of a brain-damaged baby, a 
quadriplegic farmer or business executive, and a 
horribly disfigured housewife who is a victim of 
medical malpractice.  They are not there to see that 
the will of the majority is carried out, but to protect 
the rights of the minority.  It is the obligation of this 
court in each case to carry out its constitutional 
responsibility.  With that obligation in mind, we now 
turn to the issues involved in the case now before us.345 
Tracing a long line of Kansas cases,346 the court set out a two-
step analysis in which it first determined whether the plaintiff’s 
right to a remedy had been limited.347  Then, finding that it had 
been limited,348 the court moved on to assess whether the plaintiff 
had, notwithstanding the limitation, received from the legislature 
an adequate substitution remedy.349  The court found that he had 
not.350 
In Texas Workers’ Compensation v. Garcia,351 the Texas 
Supreme Court considered a broad attack on the constitutionality 
of the 1989 amendment of the Texas Workers’ Compensation 
Act.352  Various plaintiffs alleged that “provisions of the Texas 
Workers’ Compensation Act facially violate[d] the Texas 
Constitution’s guarantees of open courts, due course of law, equal 
protection, jury trial, and obligation of contract.”353  The lower 
courts sustained a majority of the challenges and struck the Texas 
 
 344.  Bell, 757 P.2d at 255. 
 345.  Id. at 258. 
 346.  The court utilized a quid pro quo analysis as far back as 1914 when it upheld 
against an employee challenge the original Kansas workers’ compensation statute. In 
a sense, current tort reform challenges were second-generation quid pro quo attacks 
on negligence limitation. Id. at 263. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Id. at 260. 
 351.  893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995). 
 352.  Id. at 516. 
 353.  Id. at 510. 
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Act.354  The Texas Supreme Court reversed, but importantly, 
accepted the premise that any modification of the workers’ 
compensation statute had to be reasonable in substituting 
statutory for common law remedies: 
[L]egislative action withdrawing common-law 
remedies for well-established common-law causes of 
action for injuries to one’s “lands, goods, person or 
reputation” is sustained only when it is reasonable in 
substituting other remedies, or when it is a reasonable 
exercise of the police power in the interest of the 
general welfare.355 
The court concluded that it “must compare the current 
statute to the common law remedy, not to the previous statute.  
The open courts provision guarantees that a common law remedy 
will not be unreasonably abridged, not that the Legislature will 
not amend or replace a statute.”356  Thus, the court agreed on the 
critical quid pro quo point.  However, the court nevertheless 
upheld the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act under the essential 
open courts challenge.357  The gravamen of the court’s argument 
was that in a majority of cases—even under modern negligence 
doctrine—injured workers could easily fail to prevail in negligence 
cases and the record in the current case suggested to the court 
that workers would recover nothing in negligence in a large 
majority of cases: 
Although the Legislature has softened the defense of 
contributory negligence by adopting comparative 
responsibility, and this Court has abolished the 
defense of assumption of the risk, an injured employee 
pursuing the common law remedy must still prove 
that the employer was negligent and that he or she 
was not more than 50 percent negligent.  Although the 
trial court made no finding on the issue, there was 
evidence at trial that, even with these changes in the 
common law, injured employees pursuing negligence 
claims against their employers recover nothing in a 
large majority of cases.  In comparison, the Act—
 
 354.  Id.at 516-17. 
 355.  Id. at 520, citing Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 
259, 262 (Tex. 1994) (quoting Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tex. 
19555)); accord Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983), and Waites v. 
Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1977). 
 356.  Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 521. 
 357.  Id. at 523. 
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carrying forward the general scheme of the former 
act—provides benefits to injured workers without the 
necessity of proving negligence and without regard to 
the employer’s potential defenses.  In exchange, the 
benefits are more limited than the actual damages 
recoverable at common law.  We believe this quid pro 
quo, which produces a more limited but more certain 
recovery, renders the Act an adequate substitute for 
purposes of the open courts guarantee.358 
This contention by the court nicely underscores the dilemma 
faced by injured workers’ advocates advancing quid pro quo 
arguments.  A court may conclude that the remedy for a quid pro 
quo “gone bad” is to return to the negligence status quo ante.  In 
fact, this was precisely the conclusion reached by the Florida trial 
judge in Padgett.359  However, if the court in Garcia is correct, 
returning to the status quo ante might not be a good thing for 
plaintiffs.  Ultimately, the Garcia court’s argument likely proves 
too much.  Employers and their insurance carriers, having had 
the benefit of much more employer-friendly tort laws in the early 
twentieth century, were sufficiently concerned about the prospect 
of successful employee negligence suits to become proponents of 
workers’ compensation laws.360  It seems difficult to suggest that 
negligence law is better for employers now than it was in 1910.  
Though plaintiffs may experience significant difficulty in making 
out negligence claims, employers continue to be liable for possibly 
crippling damage claims, only one of which may be sufficient for 
an employer to redevelop a preference for insurance premiums.  
Nevertheless, while the plaintiffs in Garcia may have lost the 
tactical contest they may have won a strategic victory.  Time will 
tell.361 
Taking a different approach from the Texas court in Garcia, 
on the other hand, the California Supreme Court, in Fein v. 
Permanente Medical Group,362 appeared to doubt the independent 
existence under due process of a quid pro quo requirement.363  In 
Fein, an attorney who was suffering from a heart attack had been 
 
 358.  Id. at 521 (internal citations omitted). 
 359.  Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 
13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural grounds). 
 360.  FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 13. 
 361.  On the other hand, if negligence cases are routinely shunted into arbitration, 
the underlying doctrinal question may not be addressed. 
 362.  695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985). 
 363.  Id. at 681-82, n. 18. 
DUFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:39 AM 
176    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
misdiagnosed on several occasions as experiencing only muscle 
spasms.364  The attorney, who suffered harm from the 
misdiagnosis, sued in tort.365  The attorney prevailed at trial, but, 
under a tort reform statute, was limited to noneconomic damages 
of $250,000.366  The California Supreme Court rejected several 
challenges to this limitation, concluding that the legislature’s 
decision to limit noneconomic liability was not irrational.367  In a 
footnote to its decision, the Court suggested both that a quid pro 
quo theory was not applicable to its analysis and that its 
application to the case would not have changed the outcome.368  
“Indeed, even if due process principles required some ‘quid pro 
quo’ to support the statute, it would be difficult to say that the 
preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance industry 
in this state was not an adequate benefit for the detriment the 
legislation imposes on malpractice plaintiffs.”369  This statement 
exemplifies a “societal quid pro quo” argument: although the 
individual plaintiff may suffer, society as a whole, and, perhaps 
the plaintiff in other circumstances, benefits.370  An illustrative 
societal quid pro quo argument is that tort reform may lead to 
lower aggregate health care costs despite having an adverse 
impact on an individual plaintiff in a particular case.371 
Some courts, of course, reject quid pro quo unapologetically, 
holding that the common law of England was “merely statutory” 
and thus modifiable at will by a legislature.372  Where the common 
 
 364.  Id.at 669. 
 365.  Id.at 670. 
 366.  “The jury awarded $24,733 for wages lost by plaintiff to the time of trial, 
$63,000 for future medical expenses, and $700,000 for wages lost in the future as a 
result of the reduction in plaintiff’s life expectancy. Finally, the jury awarded $500,000 
for ‘noneconomic damages,’ to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment and other intangible damages sustained by plaintiff from the time of the 
injury until his death.” Id.at 670. 
 367.  Id. at 678. 
 368.  Id. at 681-82, n. 18. 
 369.  Id. The court seemed to be utilizing a societal quid pro quo argument, and 
appeared to understand the U.S. Supreme Court as having done the same thing in 
Duke Power. 
 370.  See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988) (rejecting 
argument). 
 371.  See Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976). 
 372.  Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 74 (Neb. 
2003). See generally Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 906 (Mo. 1992), 
overruled on other grounds, Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 
2012) (“[T]he Texas-Florida interpretation views the common law as an inviolate body 
of law, rather than as a starting point from which judicial declarations are subject to 
modification by legislative policy choices and subsequent judicial decisions necessary 
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law has not been supplanted by statute, some courts argue that 
reading the open courts and remedy provisions as a limitation on 
legislative power would have the effect of reifying the law as of 
the date of adoption of the provisions373 (some of which were not 
enacted until the gilded age)374 and, one might note, at some 
distance from Coke, Blackstone, and Magna Carta.  These cases 
seem to assume that recognition of due process quid pro quo or a 
constitutional right to a remedy for injury means that the 
legislature would be absolutely prevented from modifying or 
abolishing a remedy.  As Tracy Thomas argued: “As a 
fundamental right . . . the right to a remedy can still be denied if 
that denial is necessary to a compelling state interest.”375 
In sum, states vary significantly as to how or whether they 
recognize quid pro quo due process, and it is difficult to formulate 
general, multistate conclusions about the viability of the theory. 
C.  STATE EQUAL PROTECTION 
Another constitutional theory that opt-out challengers may 
attempt to utilize in challenging severe limitations to personal 
injury remedies is equal protection.  Most states follow the federal 
courts’ approach to equal protection analysis.376  On the easiest 
rendering of federal law, because the right to a recovery for 
physical injury has not been deemed fundamental, and because 
physically injured workers or persons do not make up a 
traditional suspect or quasi-suspect classification,377 state laws 
 
to meet the needs of a changing society.”) 
 373.  Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 404-05 (Idaho 1976) (rejecting quid 
pro quo altogether and adopting the reasoning of the Colorado courts: that because the 
state constitution did not adopt the common law of England, the state may modify it 
at will). 
 374.  For example, Colorado’s Constitution was ratified in 1876, Idaho’s in 1890, 
Kansas’ in 1861, Nevada’s in 1864, and South Dakota’s in 1889. See generally, ROBERT 
L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 45, 98, 135, 242, 364 (1998). 
 375.  Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a 
Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2004). 
 376.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202-04 (1976) (striking on equal protection 
grounds an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of “nonintoxicating” 3.2% beer to 
males under the age of 21, but allowing females over the age of 18 to purchase it, and 
clarifying the modern tripartite equal protection analysis). 
 377.  See Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 997 
(2002) (“In sum, equal protection incorporation would certainly treat as presumptively 
suspect discrimination based on religion, state origin, race, color, previous condition of 
servitude, and sex. The version of equal protection incorporation that I favor would 
also treat age discrimination as suspect, and might apply to some laws that 
disadvantage the poor as well. A remaining question is whether adopting equal 
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applicable to them are subject only to deferential rational basis 
review.378  The U.S. Supreme Court has directly addressed this 
rational basis review, opining that “[i]n areas of social and 
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds 
along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional 
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there 
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational basis for the classification.”379  However, not all state 
courts take this path with respect to interpretation of the equal 
protection provisions of their own constitutions. 
In Carson v. Mauer,380 the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
took the view that “the right to recover for personal injuries is . . . 
an important substantive right,”381 when it struck several 
provisions of a medical malpractice statute.382  Among challenges 
to the statute was that it violated equal protection under the state 
constitution.383  The court reaffirmed that, just as was the case 
with federal court review of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, it would not “[i]n the absence of a ‘suspect 
classification’ or a ‘fundamental right’ . . . second-guess the 
legislature as to the wisdom of or necessity for legislation.”384  
Thus, the court accepted the factual predicates upon which the 
legislature has concluded that medical malpractice reform was 
 
protection incorporation means that no categories beyond those expressly singled out 
by the constitutional text are presumptively invalid.”) 
 378.  Id. at 1016. 
 379.  F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 380.  424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), reaffirmed by Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 
1233 (N.H. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Cmty. Res. For Justice, Inc. v. City of 
Manchester, 917 A.2d 707, 721 (N.H. 2007). 
 381.  Carson, 424 A.2d at 830. 
 382.  The Court stated: 
The statute in question is part of an effort by the legislature to 
address the problems of the medical injury reparations system. In 
enacting [the statute], the legislature set forth rigorous standards 
for qualified expert testimony, created a two-year statute of 
limitations applicable to most medical malpractice actions, required 
that notice of intent to sue be given at least sixty days before 
commencing the action, prohibited the statement of the total 
damages claimed as an ad damnum or otherwise, abolished the 
collateral source rule, limited the amount of damages recoverable 
for non-economic loss to $250,000, empowered the court to order 
periodic payments of any future damages in excess of $50,000, and 
established a contingent fee scale for attorneys in medical 
malpractice actions. 
Id. at 829. 
 383.  Id. at 831. 
 384.  Id. (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). 
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necessary.385  The Carson court also acknowledged that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had applied a “substantial relationship” test—a 
requirement that statutory classifications rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of 
the legislation—only “to cases involving classifications based 
upon gender and illegitimacy.”386  Nevertheless, the Carson court 
concluded: 
Although the right to recover for personal injuries is 
not a “fundamental right,” it is nevertheless an 
important substantive right.  In Estate of Cargill v. 
City of Rochester . . . we applied the rational basis test 
in evaluating classifications which, like those in [the 
statutory provision under review], place restrictions 
on an individual’s right to recover in tort.  We now 
conclude, however, that the rights involved herein are 
sufficiently important to require that the restrictions 
imposed on those rights be subjected to a more 
rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the 
rational basis test.387 
While the court recognized that it was applying a scrutiny 
exceeding that applied in connection with Equal Protection review 
under the U.S. Constitution,388 the majority stated: “[W]e are not 
confined to federal constitutional standards and are free to grant 
individuals more rights than the Federal Constitution 
requires.”389  According to the court, the middle-level tier of review 
under which encroachments on personal injury rights had to be 
assessed required that legislation be “reasonable, not arbitrary, 
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”390 
Although Carson has subsequently been reversed on other 
grounds,391 the “important substantive right” formulation 
 
 385.  Id. 
 386.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 387.  Id. at 830 (citing Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 667 
(1979). 
 388.  Id. 
 389.  Id. at 831 (citations omitted). 
 390.  Gonya v. Comm’r N.H. Ins. Dep’t, 899 A.2d 278, 289 (N.H. 2006) (citing 
Carson, 424 A.2d at 831). 
 391.  Cmty. Res. For Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707, 721 (N.H. 
2007) (clarifying that the government had “[t]he burden [of] demonstrat[ing] that the 
challenged legislation meets this [intermediate scrutiny] test. . . . [and] may not rely 
upon justifications that are hypothesized or ‘invented post hoc in response to litigation,’ 
nor upon ‘overbroad generalizations.’”) (citations omitted). 
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continues to trigger intermediate scrutiny in New Hampshire.392  
Thus, legislative enactment of workers’ compensation opt-out, in 
conjunction with retaining the exclusive remedy rule, would 
almost certainly face heightened judicial scrutiny in New 
Hampshire by requiring the state government to justify the de 
facto elimination of the workers’ compensation remedy. 
Not all state courts agree that the right to recover for 
personal injuries is sufficiently important to trigger heightened 
scrutiny under the equal protection provisions of their state 
constitutions when the right suffers interference.  In Morris v. 
Savoy,393 for example, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a 
constitutional challenge to a medical malpractice statute.394  
Although it struck two of the challenged provisions on due process 
grounds,395 the court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection 
challenge.396  In the due process portion of its analysis, the court 
held that the statute was “unconstitutional because it does not 
bear a real and substantial relation to public health or welfare 
and further because it is unreasonable and arbitrary.”397  The 
court nevertheless rejected the equal protection challenge because 
“the statute must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of 
facts under which the classification rationally furthered a 
legitimate legislative objective.”398  These conclusions seem more 
than a little inconsistent.  The Carson court399 had also been 
willing to unflinchingly accept the legislative facts that 
surrounded the involved statute’s enactment, as it 
simultaneously rejected as arbitrary the conclusions flowing from 
those facts.400  Apparently, irrational application of presumptively 
valid facts can provide sufficient reason for rejecting legislative 
 
 392.  Carson, 424 A.2d at 830. See also Gonya, 899 A.2d at 289. 
 393.  576 N.W.2d 765 (Ohio 1991). 
 394.  Id. at 767. The challenge was to certain liability caps and the imposition of a 
collateral source rule. Id. 
 395.  Id. at 771. 
 396.  Id. at 772 
 397.  Id. at 771. 
 398.  Id. at 770 (citations omitted). 
 399.  424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980). 
 400.  The Court stated: 
[A] statute which singles out seriously injured malpractice victims 
whose future damages exceed $50,000 and requires one class to 
shoulder the burden inherent in a periodic payments scheme from 
which the general public benefits offends basic notions of fairness 
and justice. . . . [and] is an unreasonable exercise of the legislature’s 
police power and violates the State’s equal protection guarantees. 
Id. at 838 (emphasis added). 
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conclusions, but the principle is somewhat confounding. 
Morris may be more indicative of how state courts are 
presently likely to analyze equal protection challenges.401  In 
workers’ compensation contexts there have been few successful 
equal protection challenges by plaintiffs or defendants.402  The 
reason for this is likely that the public policy rationale at the time 
of the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes would have 
survived what we now call strict scrutiny, let alone survive more 
deferential standards of review.403  The major defect with respect 
to equal protection analysis is its all-or-nothing character under 
either the strict scrutiny or rational basis tests.  As Laurence 
Tribe has written in explaining why some courts have taken the 
New Hampshire intermediate scrutiny approach displayed in 
Carson: 
[An] all-or-nothing choice between minimum 
rationality and strict scrutiny ill-suits the broad range 
of situations arising under the equal protection clause, 
many of which are best dealt with neither through the 
virtual rubber-stamp of truly minimal review nor 
 
 401.  Morris itself cites several cases, which declined to apply heightened scrutiny 
on an equal protection theory. See, e.g., Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763 
P.2d 1153, 1159, 1161 (N.M. 1998); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 534 
(Va. 1989); and Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (Ind. 1980). 
 402.  But see Vasquez, CM-2014-11060L (Okla. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n) (Feb. 26, 
2016), and supra note 139 (striking Oklahoma’s Injury Benefit Act at the 
administrative level in part on equal protection grounds). 
 403.  As John Fabian Witt wrote in The Accidental Republic, the workplace injury 
situation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was dire: 
At the turn of the century, one worker in fifty was killed or disabled 
for at least four weeks each year because of a work-related accident. 
Among the population as a whole, roughly one in every thousand 
Americans died in an accident each year. For those who worked in 
dangerous industries, accident rates were considerably higher. In 
1890 alone, one railroad worker in every three hundred was killed 
on the job; among freight railroad brakemen, one out of a hundred 
died in work accidents. Nonfatal accident rates, though more 
difficult to estimate, appear to have been much higher. By one 
contemporary estimate, no fewer than 42 percent of railroad 
workers involved in the day-to-day operation of trains in the state 
of Colorado were injured on the job each year. The most 
extraordinary rates of death and injury appear to have occurred in 
the anthracite coal mines of eastern Pennsylvania during the 1850s 
and 1860s, where each year 6 percent of the workforce was killed, 6 
percent permanently crippled, and 6 percent seriously but 
temporarily disabled. 
JOHN F. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE 
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 2-3 (2004). 
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through the virtual death-blow of truly strict scrutiny, 
but through methods more sensitive to risks of 
injustice than the former and yet less blind to the 
needs of governmental flexibility than the latter.404 
Ultimately, most courts employing equal protection analysis 
would probably defer to legislative fact-finding, a development 
likely to put plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage.  Courts may 
accept, uncritically, legislative fact-finding asserting that 
workers’ compensation modifications—such as opt-out—are 
economically beneficial.  If those courts also apply deferential 
rational basis review, it is less likely that legislative fact 
determinations would be disturbed.  If, however, legislatures had 
the burden of showing a substantial relationship between the 
policy problem and the chosen legislative solution, cases might 
receive a very different judicial reception.  For example, if 
alternative benefit plans under opt-out deliver fewer benefits to 
injured workers—particularly to those who are permanently 
disabled—then the increased costs to workers must either be 
absorbed by workers or shifted elsewhere.  Courts might then 
insist on an explanation of states’ analyses of such large problems. 
On the other hand, a court might strike a tort-reform statute 
even under a “bare” rational basis analysis.  To illustrate, in 
Estate of McCall v. United States,405 the Florida Supreme Court 
struck Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic 
damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action.406  In that 
case, decedent died as a result of negligent medical treatment 
during and after childbirth by Air Force medical personnel.407  
The plaintiffs, decedent’s survivors, alleged medical malpractice 
and filed a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.408  The court found the United States liable and that the 
plaintiffs’ economic and noneconomic damages were $980,462.40 
and $2 million, respectively.409  Notwithstanding these findings, 
the court limited the plaintiffs’ recovery of wrongful death 
noneconomic damages to $1 million in accordance with Florida’s 
statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages based on 
 
 404.  Richardson, 763 P.2d at 1163 (emphasis omitted), citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1609-10 (2d ed. 1988). 
 405.  134 So.3d 894 (Fla. 2014). 
 406.  Id. at 903. 
 407.  Id. at 898-899. 
 408.  Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) (2008). 
 409.  Estate of McCall, 134 So.3d at 899. 
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medical malpractice claims.410  The court also denied a motion 
challenging the constitutionality of Florida’s wrongful death 
statutory cap under both the Florida and United States 
Constitutions.411  On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Federal Court 
of Appeals,412 the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings,413 
and, specifically contended that the statutory cap violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.414  The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed application of the Florida damages 
cap,415 but granted a motion to certify four questions to the Florida 
Supreme Court, including the question of whether the cap 
violated equal protection.416  The Florida Supreme Court struck 
the cap under equal protection analysis, applying the rational 
basis test: 
[The cap] has the effect of saving a modest amount for 
many by imposing devastating costs on a few—those 
who are most grievously injured, those who sustain 
the greatest damage and loss, and multiple claimants 
for whom judicially determined noneconomic damages 
are subject to division and reduction simply based 
upon the existence of the cap.  Under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution . . . we 
hold that to reduce damages in this fashion is not only 
arbitrary, but irrational, and we conclude that it 
“offends the fundamental notion of equal justice under 
the law.”417 
In an unusual dissection of legislative findings, the court 
went to some lengths to dispute the existence of a medical 
malpractice crisis, a cross examination culminating in the 
following statement: 
Thus, even if there had been a medical malpractice 
crisis in Florida at the turn of the century, the current 
data reflects that it has subsided.  No rational basis 
currently exists (if it ever existed) between the cap 
imposed . . . and any legitimate state purpose. . . . At 
the time, the cap on noneconomic damages serves no 
 
 410.  Id. 
 411.  Id. 
 412.  Id. 
 413.  Id. 
 414.  Id. 
 415.  Id. 
 416.  Id.  
 417.  Id. at 903 (citation omitted). 
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purpose other than to arbitrarily punish the most 
grievously injured or their surviving family members.  
Moreover, it has never been demonstrated that there 
was a proper predicate for imposing the burden of 
supporting the Florida legislative scheme upon the 
shoulders of the persons and families who have been 
most severely injured and died as a result of medial 
negligence.  Health care policy that relies upon 
discrimination against Florida families is not rational 
or reasonable when it attempts to utilize aggregate 
caps to create unreasonable classifications.  
Accordingly, and for each of these reasons, the cap on 
wrongful death noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice actions does not pass constitutional 
muster.418 
Litigants in an equal protection jurisdiction like Florida 
could expect a lively contest of workers’ compensation opt-out to 
the extent it both maintained the exclusive remedy rule and 
denied access to a workers’ compensation statute. 
 D.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON STATE RESTRAINT 
The foregoing discussion disclosed a great deal of variation 
on state judicial responses to plaintiffs’ attempts at restraining 
legislative initiatives to reduce personal injury remedies.  Not 
surprisingly, this kind of variation has led to a corresponding 
variation in litigation environments for both tort and workers’ 
compensation litigants throughout the United States.  By the end 
of the 1960s, this patchwork of uneven state court protections had 
led to a perhaps predictable race to the bottom.419 
The situation eventually compelled President Nixon to 
convene a bi-partisan commission of experts to study and make 
recommendations on the apparent breakdown of state-based 
workers’ compensation.420  The National Commission 
unanimously reported that: 
The inescapable conclusion is that State workmen’s 
compensation laws in general are inadequate and 
 
 418.  Id.at 914-15 (internal citation omitted). 
 419.  See infra note 423. 
 420.  The commission was established in Section 27 of the newly enacted 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. John F. Burton, Jr., The National 
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws: Some Reflections by the Former 
Chairman, 40 IAIABC J. 15, 15-16 (2003). 
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inequitable. The report listed nineteen “essential 
recommendations,” all of which focused on expanding 
benefits to workers: eight recommendations dealt with 
expanded coverage; nine with increased disability 
benefits; and two with improvements to medical and 
rehabilitation benefits.  Based on an insurance 
industry analysis, the National Commission estimated 
that the cost of those expanded benefits would mean 
that the average employer would pay 1.5% of payroll 
(up from 1.1%) toward workers’ compensation 
insurance.  The Commission predicted that these 
increased benefits would raise total insurance costs 
less than 50% in the vast majority of states.421 
During the course of the following decade: 
[M]ost states enacted legislation liberalizing benefits 
to workers—perhaps partly in response to the 
Commission’s recommendation that workers’ 
compensation should be federalized if states failed to 
expand benefits.  Average state compliance increased 
from a level of 6.8 out of the nineteen “essential 
recommendations” in 1972 to an average of 12.1 in 
1982, when the national trend toward expansion 
appeared to level off substantially short of the 
recommended goals.422 
An expanding opt-out movement reveals a pendulum that 
has once again swung wildly in the opposite direction.  It can 
hardly be wondered why tort and workers’ compensation 
modifications, and responses to those modifications, move in 
waves.  In sum, no stabilizing legal consensus across states as to 
the importance of personal injury rights has emerged.  Vacillation 
seems at once moral and economic.  Our pocketbooks direct 
elected representatives to rein in business costs as aggressively 
as possible.  Our moral sensibility periodically intervenes and we 
perceive the crudity of a sweeping directive.  Unsurprisingly, in 
the face of the 1960s workers’ compensation race to the bottom, 
the National Commission seriously entertained the need for 
federal intervention if states did not voluntarily enact adequate 
systems.423  Opt-out does not suggest a commitment to adequacy. 
 
 421.  Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation 
“Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 684 (1998). 
 422.  Id. 
 423.  David B. Torrey, The Federalization/Federal Standards Issue: A Short 
History Before and After NFIB v. Sebelius (U.S. 2012), 6 ABA WORKERS’ COMP. 
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V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS UNDER THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
An additional potential check on the power of states to 
severely interfere with the right of an individual to a remedy for 
invasions of personal security through mechanisms such as 
workers’ compensation opt-out is the federal due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment: “nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . . 
“424  In addition to imposing procedural restraints on states in 
connection with deprivations of life, liberty, or property,425 the 
Supreme Court has established that the clause may apply to the 
substance of state law touching various rights.426  The perennial 
question has been, which state rights are delimited by the 
clause?427  And, the Court has vacillated between a narrow and 
broader vision of the scope of the clause.428  In present day, the 
Court seems to have settled upon an historical “rooting” of the 
clause’s meaning and application.429 
This Part will first discuss a federal quid pro quo conception 
of due process and will contend that the Supreme Court has failed 
to discredit quid pro quo despite having ample opportunity to do 
so.  Subpart B. will proceed to discuss the implications of a still 
viable federal quid pro quo theory.  Subpart C. will then juxtapose 
quid pro quo with “historical” due process analysis.430  Subpart D. 
concludes by arguing that the right to a remedy for personal 
injury is important and strongly implied by both the structure and 
the social contract nature of our legal system and, therefore, 
should be recognized as protected by notions of structural due 
process. 
 
SECTIONS 2013 MIDWINTER SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE (2013), citing MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL 
Insurance 86 (1999). 
 424.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 425.  See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
 426.  See generally Rochin v. People of Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952). 
 427.  Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process after Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531 (2008). 
 428.  Id. at 1518. 
 429.  Id. (Noting that historical due process had purported to limit substantive due 
process to only those rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition and 
contending that the Supreme Court has been returning to such a position). 
 430.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997). 
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A.  FEDERAL QUID PRO QUO 
As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court, when 
upholding workers’ compensation statutes in the twentieth 
century, appeared to assume the necessity of quid pro quo—that 
common law tort rights could not be displaced unless replaced by 
reasonable or adequate substitutes.431  However, in Duke Power 
Co.,432 decided in 1978, the nuclear power industry persuaded 
Congress to place a cap on damages resulting from any future 
catastrophic nuclear accident in the amount of 560 million dollars 
per incident.433  Of the number of challenges that the plaintiffs in 
Duke Power made to the cap, they argued that such a limitation 
of liability violated federal substantive due process.434  The 
Supreme Court, in rejecting the due process claim,435 stated, “it is 
not all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a 
legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the 
recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute 
remedy.”436 
Duke Power involved preemption of state law by federal 
atomic power policy where the risk of injury was remote.437  It was 
generally understood that, in the event of a catastrophic nuclear 
incident, victims’ losses would ultimately be underwritten by the 
U.S. Government;438 there was no genuine question of injury 
benefit elimination.439  The circumstances were unique and 
 
 431.  See supra Part IV. B. 
 432.  438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
 433.  The Court stated: 
In its original form, the Act limited the aggregate liability for a 
single nuclear incident to $500 million plus the amount of liability 
insurance available on the private market—some $60 million in 
1957. The nuclear industry was required to purchase the maximum 
available amount of privately underwritten public liability 
insurance, and the Act provided that if damages from a nuclear 
disaster exceeded the amount of that private insurance coverage, 
the Federal Government would indemnify the licensee and other 
“persons indemnified” in an amount not to exceed $500 million. 
Thus, the actual ceiling on liability was the amount of private 
insurance coverage plus the Government’s indemnification 
obligation which totaled $560 million. 
Id. at 64-65. 
 434.  Id. at 82-93. 
 435.  Id.at 87-91. 
 436.  Id. at 88. 
 437.  Id. at 92-93. 
 438.  Id. at 63-64. 
 439.  See infra notes 442-48 and accompanying text. 
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distinguishable from a broad, state-law swap of tort for workers’ 
compensation rights and from the wholesale abrogation of a well-
established right by a legislature.  Despite this dissimilarity, it is 
hard to escape the impression that the Court was subjecting the 
Price-Anderson Act440 to heightened scrutiny.  Indeed, the Court 
cited with approval and explicitly contended that Duke Power was 
consistent with White: 
The logic of [White] would seem to apply with renewed 
force in the context of this challenge to the Price-
Anderson Act.  The Price-Anderson Act not only 
provides a reasonable, prompt, and equitable 
mechanism for compensating victims of a catastrophic 
nuclear incident, it also guarantees a level of net 
compensation generally exceeding that recoverable in 
private litigation.  Moreover, the Act contains an 
explicit congressional commitment to take further 
action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event 
that the $560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded.  
This panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the 
least a reasonably just substitute for the common-law 
rights replaced by the Price-Anderson Act.  Nothing 
more is required by the Due Process Clause.441 
This rhetoric does not have the feel of a “rational basis” 
opinion extolling the virtues of legislative supremacy.  On the 
contrary, the language seems quite justificatory.  At the very 
least, it seems difficult to draw from the “reasonably just 
substitute” language a conclusion that the Court once and for all 
had slammed the door on quid pro quo due process analyses. 
Seven years following Duke Power, the Court denied a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in Fein v. Permanente Medical 
Group, discussed earlier in this Article.442  The petition 
challenged, on federal due process grounds, caps on medical 
malpractice liability in connection with noneconomic damages.443  
As may be recalled, the California Supreme Court specifically 
rejected the existence of a quid pro quo due process theory.444  
Justice Stevens dissented to the dismissal, contending that the 
Court had never decided the federal quid pro quo issue: 
 
 440.  Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (Price-Anderson Act), 42 
U.S.C. ch. 23 (1957). 
 441.  Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 93. 
 442.  See supra notes 362-71 and accompanying text. 
 443.  Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 679 (Cal. 1985). 
 444.  Id. at 679-81, n. 18. 
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Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted 
compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the 
common-law or state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, 
how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an issue 
unresolved by this Court, and one which is dividing 
the appellate and highest courts of several States.  The 
issue is important, and is deserving of this Court’s 
review.  Moreover, given the continued national 
concern over the “malpractice crisis,” it is likely that 
more States will enact similar types of limitations, and 
that the issue will recur.  I find, therefore, that the 
federal question presented by this appeal is 
substantial, and dissent from the Court’s conclusion to 
the contrary.445 
Although it might be argued that the dismissal decided the 
quid pro quo issue,446 it does not appear that the Court has 
thereafter had occasion to address quid pro quo; nor has the issue 
been discussed in the federal court as if it had been resolved.  If 
White is dead, neither Duke Power nor Fein Permanente could 
have killed it. 
It has been well-argued that the quid pro quo test can be 
inflexible, that it can fail to distinguish clearly between floor and 
ceiling challenges to reform, or to help courts in distinguishing 
precisely between particular kinds of tort reforms.447  Yet there 
seems little doubt that quid pro quo is routinely discussed when 
courts become uncomfortable with threats to obviously important 
rights. 
 
 445.  Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 474 U.S. 892, 894-95 (1985). 
 446.  The Court has held that “[S]ummary dismissals are of course, to be taken as 
rulings on the merits, in the sense that they rejected the ‘specific challenges presented 
in the statement of jurisdiction’ and left ‘undisturbed the judgment appealed from.’” 
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 
463, 476 n.20 (1979) (internal citation omitted). Summary dismissals do not, however, 
have the same precedential value as does an opinion of the Court after briefing and 
oral argument on the merits. Neely v. Newton, 149 F.3d 1074, 1079 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“The Supreme Court has cautioned that for purposes of determining the binding effect 
of a summary action, the action should not be interpreted as adopting the rationale of 
the lower court, but rather as affirming only the judgment of that court.”). “Summary 
affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt 
reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction.” Mandel v. 
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). And, “[t]hey do prevent lower courts from coming 
to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by 
those actions.” Id. “[I]f the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains 
so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 
332, 344 (1975). 
 447.  Goldberg, supra note 33, at 613. 
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B. RAMIFICATIONS OF A STILL-ALIVE QUID PRO QUO: 
REVISITING OPT-OUT 
If workers’ compensation opt-out is recast as personal injury 
opt-out, the quid pro quo issue is whether courts will allow 
legislatures to grant private injurers tort immunity, and whether 
such an arrangement is a “reasonably just” substitute for tort 
rights.  The Supreme Court has hinted at the ceiling of the Due 
Process Clause in quid pro quo contexts: 
The Prince-Anderson Act not only provides a 
reasonable, prompt, and equitable mechanism for 
compensating victims of a catastrophic nuclear 
incident, it also guarantees a level of net compensation 
generally exceeding that recoverable in private 
litigation.  Moreover, the Act contains an explicit 
congressional commitment to take further action to 
aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event that the 
$560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded.  This 
panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the least a 
reasonably just substitute for the common-law rights 
replaced by the Price-Anderson Act.  Nothing more is 
required by the Due Process Clause.448 
If that is the ceiling, the question is where this leaves the 
floor of quid pro quo.  Opt-out “alternative benefit plans” appear 
to set no floor.449  There is no requirement that the plans pay any 
minimum level of benefits.450  In Oklahoma, alternative plans are 
required to pay the same “forms” of benefits as those required 
under the workers’ compensation statute.451  The statute requires 
payment of specified benefits for total disability, for partial 
disability, and for medical treatment.452  In Tennessee, critics 
allege that the proposed opt-out bill, S.B. 721,453 leaves critical 
substantive workers’ compensation decisions exclusively within 
the discretion of employers: coverage of medical expenses, 
selection of medical providers, deciding whether to end or 
 
 448.  Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 93. 
 449.  See Letter to Senator Sherrod Brown (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 24, 2016) (“ERISA 
does not give the Department [of Labor] the authority to establish adequacy levels for 
benefits in [opt-out] plans.”) (last accessed July 12, 2016), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2730159-DOL-ERISA-Opt-Out-Letter-
022416.html. 
 450.  Id. 
 451.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 203(B). 
 452.  See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, §§ 1-125 (West 2015). 
 453.  See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
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continue benefits, and whether to attempt dispute resolution.454  
No appeal of eligibility determinations is mentioned anywhere in 
the bill.455  Thus, the bill would apparently not confer plan 
participants with rights to contest substantive determinations 
under an alternative benefit plan.456  Additionally, no procedures 
for dispute resolution are set forth in the bill, and no procedures 
for selection of claim dispute factfinders are identified.457  Unlike 
the Oklahoma statute,458 the Tennessee bill would not retain the 
workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule,459 but the right to 
recover under Tennessee tort law would apparently be modified 
under the bill.460  No right to sue would exist if the employee 
“[fails] to follow instructions and rules,” is injured by “hazards 
that are commonly known and appreciated, or if the injury is 
caused by “failure to follow available safe alternatives.”461  Thus, 
employers would be afforded several affirmative defenses, 
seemingly of the type that formed the original rationale for states 
adopting workers’ compensation in the first place.462 
In a detailed study of Texas alternative benefit plans, 
Professor Alison Morantz found that, although employees did not 
have to go through benefit waiting periods under the plans they 
faced other obstacles to recovering benefits: 
Yet in other respects—for example, the commonplace 
twenty-four-hour reporting deadlines, absence of 
employee choice over medical providers, absence of 
any permanent partial or permanent total disability 
coverage, and prevalent caps on total benefits—such 
plan appeared less favorable to employees.  Moreover, 
presumably in an effort to curb tort liability, a very 
high fraction (about 85 percent) of nonsubscriber plans 
channeled disputes to mandatory arbitration.  Not 
 
 454.  David B. Torrey, Appendix B: Statement of The American Insurance 
Association, supra note 74, at 36. 
 455.  See generally S B. 721, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015). 
 456.  The bill does not provide for internal review of determinations and likely 
contemplates that all actions for non-negligent breach will be brought under ERISA. 
See generally S. B. 721, 190th Gen. Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015). 
 457.  Id. 
 458.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 209(A) (West 2015). 
 459.  S. B. 721 § 50-10-108, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015). 
 460.  Economic damages would apparently be capped at $1,000,000 per employee. 
S.B. 721 § 50-10-108(b)(1), 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015), 
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Bill/SB0721.pdf (last accessed July 12, 2016). 
 461.  S.B. 721 § 50-10-108(c)(4-7), 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015), 
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Bill/SB0721.pdf (last accessed Aug. 12, 2016). 
 462.  See DUFF, supra note 23, at 6. 
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only did virtually all companies deem their programs 
to be a success and report cost savings, but most were 
pleasantly surprised by the magnitude of these 
savings, which reportedly exceeded (on average) 50 
percent across all industries.463 
Thus, under the alternative plans analyzed by Professor 
Morantz, entire classifications of the most seriously injured 
workers were not eligible for permanent disability benefits and—
if they had signed on to an arbitration agreement as a condition 
of participating in such a plan—could also not pursue a tort 
claim.464  If it is a constitutional requirement under federal quid 
pro quo due process for a state legislature to provide a reasonable 
alternative to a tort remedy, opt-out might have a very difficult 
time surviving heightened judicial scrutiny. 
C.  QUID PRO QUO AND HISTORICALLY-ROOTED RIGHTS 
Quid Pro Quo may possibly be understood as an inchoate type 
of historical due process analysis.  The original workers’ 
compensation grand bargain was understood as a swap of 
important rights465 and was historical in at least two senses.  
First, the swap itself is over a century old466 and has, therefore, 
itself become an important part of history and tradition.  Second, 
the implication behind the bargain is that only a reasonable set of 
rights could be substituted for a tort-based right to a remedy for 
personal injury; a right that is difficult not to see through 
Blackstonian lenses.467 
 
 463.  Alison Morantz, Opting out of Workers’ Compensation in Texas: A Survey of 
Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, Regulation vs. Litig. Perspectives from Econs. And 
Law 197 200 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010). The respondents in the study reported high 
satisfaction with the magnitude of their cost savings. They were clearly winners under 
the system. Frankly, it seems a bit pointless to discuss how the plans may be better 
than workers’ compensation in some respects once it is understood that they eliminate 
permanent benefits. That qualification dwarfs everything else. It is also true, however, 
that Texas had variable injury expenses until about fifteen years ago, despite 
operating an opt-out system. Then costs began to descend. See id. at 201-02. Although 
the reasons for this are not yet clear, it is hard to ignore the Supreme Court’s 
intervening application of compulsory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act 
to employment in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001). 
 464.  After all, it is the most seriously injured workers who are permanently 
disabled, and those are the claims explicitly excluded by these alternative plans. 
 465.  See supra Part II. 
 466.  Id. 
 467.  Goldberg, supra note 33, at 545. 
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In Washington v. Glucksberg,468 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
articulated what has become a common formulation in the 
Supreme Court’s historical substantive due process doctrine: 
[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process 
Clause specifically protects those fundamental rights 
and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  
Second, we have required in substantive-due-process 
cases a “careful description” of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.469 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,470 a dissenting Justice 
Breyer warned against “the reefs and shoals that lie in wait for 
those nonexpert judges who place virtually determinative weight 
upon historical considerations.”471  Nevertheless, it seems difficult 
to avoid exploration of the historical dimensions of personal injury 
remedies in light of Glucksberg and its progeny.472  The inquiry 
resembles this article’s state law “right to a remedy” discussion.473  
The heart of the matter is whether the right to a remedy for 
personal injury—a right to redress—is “fundamental” or even 
important.  If it is difficult to identify an explicitly deeply-rooted 
historical right to a remedy for personal injury (within or outside 
a workplace) the matter can hardly be said to be resolved because: 
[T]he most fundamental rights are those that no 
government of the people would contemplate 
abridging—it is doubtful that many courts or 
legislatures have discussed whether the government 
can determine whether we are allowed to breathe air, 
but this does not make our access to oxygen any less 
grounded in history.474 
More to the point, the entire discussion of quid pro quo in 
White underscores that, at least at a certain juncture in history, 
the Supreme Court has likely suspected that right to a remedy for 
 
 468.  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 469.  Id. at 720-21 (internal quotation omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
 470.  561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 471.  Id. at 916 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 472.  See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 63, 92 (2006). 
 473.  See infra Part IV. A. 
 474.  Abigail Alliance For Better Access v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 722 (D.C. 
Cir. 207) (en banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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physical injury was of heightened importance.  Whether that 
sense of importance was from the due process clause or from 
elsewhere in the Fourteenth Amendment is difficult to say.  The 
architects of the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and 
immunities clause, for example, had the benefit of Justice 
Bushrod Washington’s 1823 interpretation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution in Corfield v. 
Coryell.475  In Corfield,476 plaintiffs challenged a New Jersey 
statute forbidding out of state persons from gathering clams and 
oysters.477  Justice Washington rejected the claim that the law ran 
afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the several states?  We feel no hesitation 
in confining these expressions to those privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; 
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free 
governments; and which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which 
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming 
free, independent, and sovereign.  What these 
fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more 
tedious than difficult to enumerate.  They may, 
however, be all comprehended under the following 
general heads: Protection by the government; the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire 
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and 
obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to 
such restraints as the government may justly 
prescribe for the general good of the whole.478 
Whether John Bingham, a principal author of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,479 consciously presumed during the drafting of the 
Amendment that the right to “obtain safety”480 was a “privilege 
and immunity”481 of citizens is beyond the scope of this 
discussion.482  It nevertheless seems plain enough, historically 
 
 475.  See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City 
of Chicago’s Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad 
Thing For Rights, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 561, 589-90 (2011). 
 476.  6 Fed. Cas. 546 (Pa. E.D. 1823). 
 477.  Id. at 548. 
 478.  Id. at 551-52. 
 479.  Jackson, supra note 475, at 589. 
 480.  Id. at 590. 
 481.  Id. at 589. 
 482.  Id. 
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speaking, that colonists, founders, and republicans would have 
recognized a right to a remedy for personal injury.483  However, 
substantive due process runs deeper than history. 
In McDonald, the Supreme Court struck municipal handgun 
restrictions, extending Heller’s reach to the states.484  Although 
not willing to broaden the cramped view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause (established in 
the Slaughterhouse cases),485 Justice Alito ultimately opined that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms.486  His opinion, in many 
respects, mirrors arguments made in the state courts regarding 
the historical grounding of tort law and the right to a remedy for 
physical injury.487 
The right to keep and bear arms was also widely protected by 
state constitutions at the time when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified.  In 1868, 22 of the 37 States in the Union had state 
constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep 
and bear arms.  Quite a few of these state constitutional 
guarantees, moreover, explicitly protected the right to keep and 
bear arms as an individual right to self-defense.  What is more, 
state constitutions adopted during the Reconstruction era by 
former Confederate States included a right to keep and bear arms.  
A clear majority of the States in 1868, therefore, recognized the 
right to keep and bear arms as being among the foundational 
rights necessary to our system of Government.  In sum, it is clear 
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.488 
In response to this familiar historical stratagem—attempting 
to establish that a right was recognized as fundamental during 
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, should 
 
 483.  See Goldberg, supra note 33, at 545, 551. 
 484.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 485.  Id. at 750. 
 486.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (striking District of 
Columbia’s gun restrictions). 
 487.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749-50. 
 488.  Id. at 758 (citing Calabresi & Agudo, Individual Rights Under State 
Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are 
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 50 (2008)). See 
Ala. Const., Art. I, § 28 (1868); Conn. Const., Art. I, § 17 (1818); Ky. Const., Art. XIII, 
§ 25 (1850); Mich. Const., Art. XVIII, § 7 (1850); Miss. Const. Art. I, § 15 (1868); Mo. 
Const., Art. I, § 8 (1865); Tex. Const., Art. I, § 13 (1869). See also Mont. Const., Art. 
III, § 13 (1889); Wash. Const., Art. I, § 24 (1889); Wyo. Const., Art. I, § 24 (188). See 
also State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wyo. 1986). 
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be considered fundamental in present times489—Justice Stevens 
replied: 
More fundamentally, a rigid historical methodology is 
unfaithful to the Constitution’s command.  For if it 
were really the case that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of liberty embraces only those rights “so 
rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to 
require special protection,” then the guarantee would 
serve little function, save to ratify those rights that 
state actors have already been according the most 
extensive protection.  That approach is unfaithful to 
the expansive principle Americans laid down when 
they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the 
level of generality they chose when they crafted its 
language; it promises an objectivity it cannot deliver 
and masks the value judgments that pervade any 
analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are 
sufficiently “rooted”; it countenances the most 
revolting injustices in the name of continuity, for we 
must never forget that not only slavery but also the 
subjugation of women and other rank forms of 
discrimination are part of our history; and it effaces 
this Court’s distinctive role in saying what the law is, 
leaving the development and safekeeping of liberty to 
majoritarian political processes.  It is judicial 
abdication in the guise of judicial modesty.490 
This is where historical analyses often end.  One side (it is 
unimportant which side) will argue that an important right, 
though undeniably important, is not sufficiently valued within 
the text of the Constitution to warrant careful protection.491  The 
other side will retort that the right under discussion has been 
effectively protected against infringement by the states and “is 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”492  As is the case in state 
law contexts already considered, in the absence of a constitutional 
amendment or of the occasional change of perspective of a key 
Supreme Court Justice, there is little more to say once a mode of 
historical analysis has been decided upon.493  In the context of the 
 
 489.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767-69. 
 490.  Id. at 875-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 491.  See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), rev’d on other 
grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
 492.  Id. at 325. 
 493.  See, e.g., Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-
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workers’ compensation quid pro quo, it is unclear whether 
historical analysis was at the root of the Supreme Court’s view 
that tort could not be supplanted without substitution of a 
reasonably just substitute.  It is certainly possible that the Court 
may have found the tort right deserving of due process protection 
irrespective of its historical significance; however, some work is 
required to accept such a conclusion. 
D. STRUCTURAL DUE PROCESS, LOCKEAN PROVISOS, AND 
MCDONALD 
No just legal system could conclude that the right to a remedy 
for personal injury—particularly, for physical injury—is subject 
to significant modification or eradication on the whim of a 
legislature.  However, workers’ compensation opt-out carries the 
potential for eradicating both an underlying tort right and the 
derivative workers’ compensation right.  In a similar vein, 
incremental erosion of workers’ compensation rights continually 
creates the potential for inadequate remediation of injured 
workers.  Following John Goldberg, this Article contends that: 
[I]t might be helpful to conceive of the right to a law of 
redress as one of a special set of due process rights that 
entitle individuals to certain governmental structures 
and certain bodies of law.  If this notion of structural 
due process is sound, it will encompass more than just 
tort law, understood as a law for the redress of wrongs.  
Contract, criminal, family, and property law likewise 
seem plausible for candidates for inclusion.494 
As Goldberg has further argued, a structural due process 
theory can provide a framework for connecting areas of private 
and public law.495  The argument for elevating the right to a 
remedy for personal injury is not a mechanical appeal to either 
natural law or to explicit constitutional text.  Rather, it involves 
an assessment of what our legal tradition has in fact valued over 
the centuries.  To say to the factory worker that the right to 
pursue a remedy for the loss of an arm may be dispensed with 
whenever a legislature believes a reasonable remedy would be too 
expensive is unacceptable on an almost primordial level.  Indeed, 
 
72 (2003) (striking a Texas same-sex sodomy law and, with respect to historical 
analysis, stating, “[i]n all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half 
century are of most relevance here.”) 
 494.  Goldberg, supra note 33, at 625. 
 495.  Id. 
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it raises questions as to whether individuals would, in the original 
position, assent to such a social arrangement.  The idea of 
structural due process centers on intuitions about the nature of 
this original social arrangement.  Goldberg suggests the 
structural due process right as potentially: 
[U]nderstood as an individual entitlement to certain 
political institutions, operating in accordance with 
certain norms or principles.  The right to a vote that 
takes place under appropriate conditions, one might 
argue, is a guarantee of structure of the same sort as 
the right to a law for the redress of private wrongs, 
and the right to a government of separated powers.496 
However, it must be said, respectfully, that this formulation 
unnecessarily dances around the primacy of the right to personal, 
physical security.  People who have routinely been exposed to 
physical danger have no reason to question the importance of 
physical security.  The importance of such a right can be vague 
only to those who are routinely secure. 
It is evident that our legal tradition does, in fact, value and 
protect such a right to personal security.  One does not have to 
accept the view that only rights deeply-rooted in a formal 
historical sense count as “important” to acknowledge with implicit 
historical evidence what our legal system has valued.  Steven 
Calabresi and Sarah Agudo have found, for example, that in 1868, 
two-thirds of state constitutions had provisions guaranteeing 
unenumerated inalienable, natural, or inherent rights, and have 
used the term “Lockean Natural Rights” to refer to those rights.497  
Justice Alito relied on Calabresi and Agudo’s work in 
McDonald,498 and it is evident that the Court has now accepted 
the existence of unenumerated rights.499  The Lockean 
characterization of these rights is traceable to George Mason’s 
authorship in the original draft of the Virginia Constitution’s Bill 
of Rights.500  For purposes of this article, two of Mason’s early 
drafts of this language will suffice to illustrate the importance of 
security to the Framers. 
Record of Mason’s Lockean theory of government is first 
 
 496.  Id. 
 497.  Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees, 
93 TEX. L. REV. 1299 (2015). 
 498.  Id. at 1302. 
 499.  Id. 
 500.  Id. at 1314. 
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uncovered in a transcript of his Remarks on Annual Elections for 
the Fairfax Independent Company in 1775,501 one year prior to the 
1776 adoption of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.502  The main 
point of the remarks was that the Fairfax Independent Company 
should hold annual elections for its militia officers.503  Mason 
elaborated considerably as follows: 
We came equals into this world, and equals shall we 
go out of it.  All men are by nature born equally free 
and independent.  To protect the weaker from the 
injuries and insults of the stronger were societies first 
formed; when men entered into compacts to give up 
some of their natural rights, that by union and mutual 
assistance they might secure the rest; but they gave 
up no more than the nature of the thing required.  
Every society, all government, and every kind of civil 
compact therefore, is or ought to be, calculated for the 
general good and safety of the community.  Every 
power, every authority vested in particular men is, or 
ought to be, ultimately directed to this sole end; and 
whenever any power or authority whatever extends 
further, or is of longer duration than is in its nature 
necessary for these purposes, it may be called 
government, but it is in fact oppression.504 
Then, in 1776, Mason submitted his first draft of similar 
language for the Virginia “Lockean Rights” constitutional 
guarantee.505  The language states: 
That all Men are born equally free and independant 
[sic], and have certain inherent natural Rights, of 
which they can not by any Compact, deprive or divest 
their Posterity; among which are the Enjoyment of 
Life and Liberty, with the Means of acquiring and 
possessing Property, and pursueing [sic] and 
obtaining Happiness and Safety.506 
In each formulation, the right to safety is mentioned.507  This 
 
 501.  Id. 
 502.  Id. 
 503.  Id. 
 504.  Id. (citing George Mason, Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax 
Independent Company (Apr. 17-26, 1775), in 1 The Papers of George Mason, 1725-92 
(Robert A Rutland ed., 1970)). 
 505.  Id. 
 506.  Id. at 1315. 
 507.  Id. at 1305-06. 
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seems unsurprising since in 1765 Blackstone discussed “personal 
security” as first among the “absolute rights” of the English law 
of that time.508 
The purpose of this foray into history is not to say it should 
be “cited” because it is history, but rather, because it is correct.  It 
is nearly impossible to suppose that any person would consciously 
enter into a society that denies remedy for physical injury caused 
by wrongful conduct.  While McDonald protects one aspect of 
personal security—physical self-defense through firearms509—it 
is much to be hoped that substantive due process might equally 
provide self-defense through utilization of those processes 
rendering resort to arms less necessary.510  That seems the more 
fitting ideal of self-defense for a civilized society.  At the end of the 
day, many people will suffer injury in the workplace.  It is true 
that a number of those injuries will be truly accidental and would 
not have been remedied under the law of negligence; yet it is 
equally clear that many injuries will have resulted from the 
negligence of an employer.  It is unacceptable and violative of 
structural due process that the American legal system could leave 
those injured employees without a reasonable remedy for injury.  
However, that is exactly what both opt-out and the continuous 
erosion of workers’ compensation benefits threaten. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is evident that an opt-out movement seeks to persuade 
states to substantially immunize employers within their borders 
from legal liability for workplace injuries.  Such a design would 
mark a decisive break with the quid pro quo grand bargain of the 
early twentieth century.  Whether this movement will ultimately 
succeed depends in large part on the number of state judiciaries 
willing to interpret state constitutions as not providing a right to 
a remedy for personal injury.  Many judiciaries are unlikely to 
allow such a dramatic encroachment on what has been 
understood in many states to be an important, if not fundamental, 
right.  However, there is a risk of some states getting caught up 
 
 508.  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (George 
Chase, 2d ed. 1884). 
 509.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767-68 (2010). 
 510.  Alito’s conception of self-defense is essentially “pre-political.” We lay down our 
arms with the expectation that society will provide mechanisms of protection. At that 
point it is only when the state fails to protect us that resort to self-defense becomes 
morally justifiable. See Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 
PAC. PHIL. Q. 332, 357-58 (2001). 
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in a “race to the bottom,” where states not recognizing a right to 
a remedy for physical injury become havens of low-cost labor and, 
thus, exert pressure on states that safeguard traditional rights to 
follow suit. 
Throughout this Article, workers’ compensation has been 
discussed in tandem with tort remedies for personal, and 
especially physical, injuries.  The discussion has, in reality, been 
a broader reflection on the limits of tort reform.  Whether the 
particular context in such a conversation is products liability, 
medical malpractice, statutes of repose, or workers’ 
compensation, the underlying issue is the limits of legislative 
discretion in reducing personal injury remedies.  Opt-out is simply 
the most recent social consideration of who will bear losses 
occasioned by physical injury.  However, opt-out crosses a line not 
often crossed in earlier tort reform debates.  It is one thing to say 
that noneconomic damages may be capped.  It is quite another to 
say that the right to economic damages may be significantly 
circumscribed.  To understand the radical nature of the project it 
must be constantly remembered that workers’ compensation 
already represents a significant compromise by workers of 
economic damages.  An entire range of compensatory damages is 
simply not available as a result of the Grand Bargain.  A century 
ago, workers had already completely surrendered noneconomic 
damages.  Many states struggle politically over the adequacy of 
benefits provided to injured workers.  As with Florida, credible 
arguments can be made that inadequate benefits represent, as a 
practical matter, breach of the quid pro quo.  Opt-out, without 
question, completely breaks the Bargain. 
Without a legal guarantee of some level of benefits for 
specified degrees of incapacity, opt-out is not any kind of legal 
substitute for tort.  The question White was able to defer is 
presented in the full light of day: “it perhaps may be doubted 
whether the state could abolish all rights of action, on the one 
hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up something 
adequate in their stead.  No such question is here presented, and 
we intimate no opinion upon it.”511  The Court may now be forced 
to intimate an opinion upon such abolishment and its 
jurisprudence may not be up to the task, though Lockean provisos 
be thrown by the wayside.  If the Court does not intervene, one 
can anticipate renewed debates about the advisability of muscular 
federalization of workers’ compensation as cost-shifts ruble 
 
 511.  New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1912). 
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through the economy.  If workers’ compensation does not pay the 
costs associated with injured workers, something or someone else 
will.  In that event, privatization of public law will have completed 
its march through the domain of employment law and into the 
very heart of structural due process. 
 
